OF COMMON SENSE. 



377 



mon Sense, of using the term literally ; and it is " to Dr. Reid," says Mr. 

 Stewart, "that we owe the important remark that all these notions (images, 

 phantasms, &c.) are wholly hypothetical:"* and that we have no ground for 

 supposing that in any operation of the mind there exists in it an object distinct 

 from the mind itself. 



With respect to the division of the qualities of bodies just adverted to, 

 though derived from the views of Sir Isaac Newton, I am ready to admit that 

 it is loose, and in some respects, perhaps, erroneous. Nor is this to be won- 

 dered at; for I have already had frequent occasions to observe, that it is a 

 subject upon which we are totally ignorant ; and that we are rather obliged 

 to suppose, than are capable of proving the existence of even the least con- 

 troverted primary qualities of bodies, as extension, solidity, and figure, in 

 order to avoid falling into the absurdity of disbelieving a material substrate. 

 But the supporters of the new hypothesis have no reason to triumph upon this 

 point, since it is a general doctrine of their creed that all the qualities of 

 matter are equally primary or real; in the interpretation of which, however, 

 the sentiments of Mr. Stewart are wider from those of Dr. Reid than Dr. 

 Reid's are from Mr. Locke's. 



Nor are they altogether clear from the very same charge here advanced 

 against Mr. Locke : " Professor Stewart, in his Elements, says, * Dr. Reid has 

 justly distinguished the quality of colour from what he calls the appearance 

 of colour, which last can only exist in a mind.' And Dr. Reid himself says, 

 * The name of colour belongs indeed to the cause only, and not to the effect.' " 

 Here, then, we have it unequivocally from Dr. Reid, that colour is a quality 

 in an external body, — and the sensation occasioned by it in the mind is only 

 the appearance of that external quality !! — Would any one suppose that such 

 doctrine could come from the illustrious defender of non-resemblances 1— 

 from the founder of the school which ridicules Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, 

 for supposing that our ideas of primary qualities are resemblances of those 

 qualities 1 — " What is the appearance of any thing but a resemblance of it ? 

 An appearance of any thing means the highest degree of resemblance ; or 

 that precise resemblance of it which makes it seem to be the thing itself "f 

 Appearance^ in Dr. Reid's sense of the term, is precisely assimilated to the 

 phantasm of Aristotle. 



In reality, neither of these objections against Mr. Locke's theory seem to 

 have weighed very heavy with Dr. Beattie, whose chief ground of controversy 

 is drawn from another source ; from Locke's having opposed the Cartesian 

 doctrine of innate ideas and principles : or, in other words, from his having 

 opposed M. Des Cartes's gratuitous assertion tha^ infallible notions of a God, 

 of matter, of consciousness, of moral right, together with other notions of a 

 like kind, are implanted in the mind, and may be found there by any man who 

 will search for them ; thus superseding the necessity for discipline and educa- 

 tion, and putting savages upon a level with theologians and moral philoso- 

 phers. To confute this absurdity of M. Des Cartes is the direct object of 

 the first book of the Essay on Human Understanding ; "and it is this first 

 book," says Dr. Beattie, " which, with submission, I think the worst and most 

 dangerous."! Here again, however, it is altogether unnecessary for me to 

 offer a vindication, for it has been already offered by one of the most able 

 supporters of the new system, Mr. Dugald Stewart himself; who thus ob- 

 serves, as though in direct contradiction to his friend Dr. Beattie : " the hypo- 

 thesis of innate ideas thus interpreted (by Des Cartes and Malebranche) 

 scarcely seems to have ever merited a serious refutation. In England, for 

 many years past, it has sunk into complete oblivion, excepting as a monument 

 of the follies of the learned."^ 



We have thus far noticed three objections advanced against Mr. Locke's 

 system by the three warmest champions for the new hypothesis. And it is a 

 curious fact, that they are almost advanced singly ; for upon these three points 



* Elcm. ch. iii. § ii. Fenrne's Essay, p. 23. 



t t'earne's Essay on Consciousness, ch. xii. p. 247, 2d edit. 



t Beattie on Truth, part ii. ch. ii. sect. i. § 2. $ Essays, vol. i. p. 117. 



