386 



ON THE HYPOTHESIS 



self, adopt the very doctrine of Aristotle and Des Cartes, both of whom held' 

 the same tenet 1 the former, indeed, calling this separate apparition uphantasmt 

 which is a mere change of the Latin term apparition into a Greek word.* 



But where, let me again ask, is the residence, and what is the nature of this 

 many-titled faculty, which is neither sense nor mind ; and is thus capable of: 

 discerning what neither sense nor mind can comprehend ] Every other prin-, 

 ciple or faculty has its peculiar seat, and we know how to track it to its form. 

 Instinct is the operation of the power of organized life by the exercise of 

 certain natural laws, directing it to the perfection of the individual ; and 

 wherever organized life is to be found, there is instinct. Irritation exists in 

 the muscular fibre ; sensation in nervous cords ; intelligence in the gland of 

 the brain : for there is its seat, whatever may be -its essence. But where is 

 the seat, and what is the nature of this new principle 1 Is it capable of a 

 separate exictence 1 Does it expire with the body ? Or does it accompany 

 and still direct the soul after death 1 These are important questions : what is 

 the answer to them 1 Or is there any other to be found than that of Dr. Reid 

 already noticed? — " Common sense is a part of human nature which hath never 

 been explained."! 



And what, after all, is it designed to teach us ? What is the number and 

 the precise character of those primary maxims, or instinctive notions, or 

 natural dictates, or inspired truths, or whatsoever else they may be called, which 

 form the sum of its communication ] How are we to know what is a genuine 

 and infallible first principle from what has the mere semblance of one and is 

 spurious 1 Are the founders of the system agreed upon this subject among 

 themselves ] If so, they are far more fortunate than the Cartesians upon the 

 first principles, the Kotvdi'iwoiai of their own school. If they be not, their 

 foundation slips from them in a moment, and all is wild and visionary ; and 

 every one may find a first principle in what his own fancy may suggest, or 

 his own inclination lead him to. Yet we have no proof that any such conven- 

 tion has ever been settled ; nor has any individual been bold enough to furnish 

 a catalogue from the repository of his own endowment. 



In few words, the whole of this hypothesis is nothing more than an attempt 

 to revive the Cartesian scheme, so far as relates to, perhaps, the most obnox- 

 ious part of it, the doctrine of innate ideas, but to revive it under another 

 name. Beattie and Stewart have, in fact, indirectly admitted as much, though 

 neither of them have chosen to avow the design openly. The worst and 

 most dangerous part of Mr. Locke's system, in the opinion of Dr. Beattie, is 

 his first book — that very book in which this doctrine meets with its death- 

 blow. While Mr. Stewart, notwithstanding the contempt with which he pro- 

 fesses to treat this fanciful tenet of innate ideas, asserts almost immediately 

 afterward, that his chief objection to it consists in its name, and the absurdi- 

 ties that have been connected with it ;J and adds, that '''•perhaps he might 

 even venture to say,^^ if separated from these, it would agree in substance with 

 the conclusion he had been attempting to establish.*^ 



It was my intention to have pursued this hypothesis in another direction, 

 and to have pointed out its decisive tendency to an encouragement of mental 

 indolence and immorality ; a tendency, however, altogether unperceived by 



* " The scarlet rose which is before me is still a scarlet rose when I shut my eyes, and was so at mid- 

 night when no eye saw it. Tiie colour remains when the appearance ceases : it remains the same when 

 the appearance changes Toaix isoti in the jaundice it has still another appearance; but he is easily 

 convinced that the change is m his eye, and not in the colour of the object. When a coloured body is 

 presented, tliere is a certain apparition lo the eye or to the mind, which we have called the appearance of 

 colour. Mr. Locke calls it an idea, and, indeed, it may be called so with the greatest propriety. Hence 

 the appearance is, in ihe iinaginaiion, so closely united with the quality called a scarlet colour, that they 

 are apt lo be mistaken for one and the same thing, although they are in reality so different and so unlike, 

 that one is an idea in the mind, the other is a quality of body."— Inquiry, &c. ch. vi. lecture iv. p. 172, 173. 

 175, edit. 4. Lond.1785. i 



t Inquiry, ch. v. sect iii. p. 115. % Essay iii. p. 120. 



^ "Perhaps I might even venture to say that, were the ambitious and obnoxious epithet innate laid aside, 

 and all the absurdities discarded which are connected either with the Platonic, with the Scholastic,or with the 

 Cartesian hypothesis, concerning the nature of ideas,"" this last theory (" the antiquated theory of innate 

 Ideas," as he has just above called it, and to which he here refers) would agree in substance with the conclu- 

 sion which I have been attempting to establish by an induction of facts."— Phil. Essay iii. p. 120, 4to. 1810. 



