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ON THE GENERAL 



Now, it is the peculiar feature of physiology, and especially as studied upon 

 the principles of induction, that, as far as it has proceeded, it has discovered 

 a general adaptation of means to a proposed end ; and has hence placed the 

 doctrine of final causes, as it has been incorrectly, and not without some de- 

 gree of confusion, denominated, — of causes, however, operating to a final 

 intention, — upon a basis too strong to be shaken by the ridicule of many 

 modern philosophers, sheltering themselves under an erroneous construction 

 of Lord Bacon's views upon the subject.* What, then, are the uses or pro- 

 posed ends of this extensive and complicated machinery of the mind of man? 

 What are the respective parts which its various faculties, in the order in 

 which we have now arranged them, are intended to fulfil, and the means by 

 which they are to operate ? 



Their object is threefold, and in every respect most important, and ad- 

 mirably calculated to prove the wisdom and benevolence of the almighty 

 Architect : they are the grand sources by which man becomes endowed with 

 knowledge, moral freedom, and happiness; and is hence fitted to run the 

 elevated race of a rational and accountable being. From the powers of the 

 understanding he derives the first; from those of volition or election the 

 second ; and from the passions or motive powers the third. Yet never let it 

 be forgotten, that he can in no respect, or at least to no considerable extent 

 or good purpose, possess either the one or the other, unless the mind, as an 

 individual agent, maintain its self-dominion, and exercise a due degree of 

 government over its own forces. This, I think, must be obvious to every 

 one; and it is in this harmonious balance, this equable guidance and control, 

 that the perfection of the human character can alone consist and exhibit 

 itself. Unless the faculties of the understanding be called forth, there can 

 be no knowledge ; and unless they be properly directed, though there may 

 indeed be knowledge, it will be of a Avorse nature than utter ignorance; we 

 shall pluck, not of the mixed tree of the knowledge of good and evil, as it 

 stood before the fall, but from the tree of the knowledge of evil alone, with- 

 out any union or participation of good. In like manner, unless the will and 

 the passions be under an equal degree of guidance, the mind can be neither 

 independent nor happy; a mental chaos must usurp the place of order, and 

 the whole be misrule and confusion. 



We are too much in the habit, both in common life and in philosophy, of 

 regarding the faculties of the mind as distinct agents from the mind itself, as 

 though the latter were nothing more than a house or repository for their 

 reception. This is particularly true in respect to the faculty of the will ; for 

 we are perpetually told that the will operates upon the understanding or the 

 mind ; and that unless the will be free, the man himself can have no freedom. 



Now, the will, like the memory or the judgment, is a mere power or ability, 

 and freedom is another power or ability ; but powers or abilities of one kind 

 cannot belong to or be the property of powers or abilities of another kind : 

 they can only belong to or be the property of some agent, and in this case the 

 mind is the only agent. The question, therefore, whether the will be free, 

 can only mean, if it mean any thing, whether the mind be free, of which the 

 will is a power or attribute ; and to the question thus modified, I have no 

 hesitation in stating, that the mind is perfectly free to do whatever it wills. 

 I do not say whatever it desires ; for the desire is a diff'erent faculty from the 

 WILL ; and though too generally confounded with each other, for the want of 

 clear ideas upon the subject, the two are frequently in a state of direct oppo- 

 sition. Thus, a man may desire to fly, but he never wills it ; and for this 

 plain reason, that though the action may be a matter of desire, it can never be 

 a matter of volition ; for to suppose the will or power of choosing to be exerted 

 upon a subject in which there is no power of choosing, is to suppose an ab- 



•^Causaium finalium inquisitio stei ilis e^t, et, tanquam Virgo Deo consecrata, nihil paiit. Such is his 

 celebrated aphorism : but the term inquisitio does not relate to tiie subject or doctrine itself, but merely to 

 its being made a branch of physical instead of metaphysical philosophy. The discoveries of modern times 

 have sufficiently shown that Bacon was deceived upon this last point. But it is perfectly clear from other 

 passages in his writings that he did not mean to controvert the doctrine itself. See Stewart's EJements, 

 vol. ii. p. 454. 



