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ON TASTE, GENIUS, 



lowing passage : — " The emotions of sublimity and beauty are uniformly 

 ascribed, both in popular and philosophical language, to the imagination. The 

 fine arts are considered as the arts which are addressed to the imagination, 

 and the pleasures they afford are described, by way of distinction, as the 

 pleasures of the imagination." Now, this maybe popular language, but it is 

 by no means philosophical. The poet as a poet may talk of the pleasures 

 of imagination, because he limits his ideas to pleasurable objects, and sub- 

 mits them to the selective hand of genius and taste ; but will the madman, 

 or even at all times the lover, talk also of its pleasures 1 Shakspeare tells 

 us, no ; and in proof hereof gives us in his Midsummer Night's Dream an 

 exquisite picture of the different subjects on which their respective imagina- 

 tions are exercised : 



Lovers and madmen have guch seething brains, 



Such sJjaping pliantasies that apprehend 



More than cool reason ever comprehends. 



The lunatic, the lover, and tlie poet 



Are of Imagination all compact. 



One sees more devils than vast iiell can hold ; 



That is the madman. The lover, all is frantic, 



Sees Helen's beauty in a brow of Egypt. 



The poet's eye, in a fine plirensy rolling, 



Doth glance from lieaven to earth, from earth to heaven 



And as imagination bodies forth 



The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen 



Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing 



A local habitation and a name. 



This, indeed, is the language of philosophy though put into verse. The 

 madman, the lover, and the poet are described as being joint subjects to the 

 dominion of imagination; while the general current of their ideas, from its 

 vehemence, abruptness, and audacity, is denominated a phrensy. But the 

 phrensy of the poet is distinctly stated to be of a superior kind to that of the 

 rest, and is distinguished by the epithet Jine, delicate, refined, polished; and, 

 consequently, imports skill or regulation ; taste, genius, or both together. 

 It necessarily implies a something besides the simple imagination, that unites 

 with and controls it; and hence accurately accords with the view of the sub- 

 ject now taken. 



Let us proceed to the faculty of genius. This I have defined to be that 

 power of the mind which calls forth and combines ideas with great rapidity 

 and vivacity, and with an intuitive perception of their congruity or incongruity. 



Genius is, therefore, in few words, imagination with intuitive judgment. 

 It distinguishes the man of fine phrensy, as Shakspeare expresses it, from 

 the man of mere phrensy. It is a sort of instantaneous insight, that gives us 

 knowledge without going to school for it. Sometimes it is directed to one 

 subject, sometimes to another ; but under whatever form it exhibits itself, 

 it enables the individual who possesses it to make a wonderful and almost 

 miraculous progress in the line of his pursuit. Sometimes it attaches itself 

 to the sweet harmony of sounds, and we then behold an infant of eight or 

 ten years of age evincing the science and execution of an adult and finished 

 musician. Sometimes it rejects the science of sounds, and prefers that of 

 numbers ; and we behold a boy of twelve years old solving, almost instanta- 

 neously, arithmetical questions which would cost ?in expert practitioner in 

 the common way a labour of many hours. Sometimes we find it enamoured 

 of the beauty of colours or the charms of eloquence ; and we are struck with 

 the precocity of perfection which it evinces in either case. 



In other instances we see it descending to the arts and labours of common 

 life, and diffusing intuitive knowledge among the multitude. Go to the busy 

 'Change ; and you will find some individuals allowed by general consent to 

 have a peculiar genius, or talent, as it is often called, for commerce ; in other 

 words, who are capable of calling forth and combining commercial ideas with 

 great speed and vivacity, and with that intuitive perception of their agreement 

 or disagreement which leads them to the most judicious results — results 

 which the surrounding crowd would only be able to attain by a long catena* 



