210 



THE AMEBIC AS XATVRALIST [Vol. Lilt 



must find a definite correspondence between separate fac- 

 tors of the cause and separate factors of the effect,' and 

 (2) he appears to believe that in any mechanical expla- 

 nation of action the character of the response must be 

 determined by the immediate sensuous stimuli them- 

 selves, without regard to the representative (associa- 

 tional) character of these stimuli. 



Driesch, like other vitalists, lays great stress upon 

 "adaptive" or "regulative" phenomena, though he 

 makes no claim that these necessarily demonstrate the 

 truth of vitalism. Indeed, it will be noted that the three 

 foregoing "proofs" rest on quite other grounds. We 

 may safely say, however, that for most biologists the 

 great stum])ling-hlock to a consistent mechanical expla- 

 nation has been this central fact of oru'anic "purposeful- 

 ness." In pre-Darwinian davs the Avliole subject was a 

 mystery, which science clieerfully handed over to theol- 

 ogy for solution. Later, we grew accustomed to the idea 

 that much which seemed pur])oseful in nature was the 

 outcome of "chance." But for many ther-e was always 

 a considerable residuum which deiied solution. For 

 tiiere certainh mm m to hv c.i^..^ <.l <i(l<ipti\.' n'-pon-e 1o 

 Axhollx new s, In., tin,,., tii.it ( .mi imt In accuuiit^l to, on 

 thebuM^of.nMNol\..lnh.ii.niiMn \im1 t ni 1 h. . nioi ( . il 

 is now obvious that wo smule theory ot evolutn)n yi't 

 proposed, nor, indeed, all of them combined, c[in ade- 

 quately account for much that has come to pass. 



In the face of these perplexities, it is but natural that 

 many have taken refuge once more in various intangible 

 forces and principles, almost wholly devoid of positive 

 attributes, and agreeing only in their alleged competence 



