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THE AMERICAN NATURALIST 



[Vol. LIU 



to point out, however, that on neither assumption does 

 the introduction of conscious purpose supply a missing 

 link in our explanation of the "teleological" in nature. 

 Whether or not we admit the efficacy of mental states, in- 

 dependently of their physical concomitants, we have 

 already seen that conscioils purpose must proceed on the 

 basis of experimentation. It must have learned through 

 trial that a given means will lead to the attainment of a 

 given end. The existence of any primary foreknowledge 

 of the relation of means to end is contradicted in our own 

 every-day experience. 



It may be useful to introduce a description by a psy- 

 chologist^ of what actually occurs when we are trying to 

 solve a problem: 



It is. therefore, a false theory of our own i)urposeful 

 actions that is projected backward into organic nature 

 b\' the p^ycho-vitalists. The existence of instinctive 

 ,i('ts. which tit means to ends, prior to experience, in no 

 WAV iiivarulates what I have said. For these may be 

 assmued to be based, in some way, on past racial exjie- 

 rience. And, in any case, so far as an action is instinc- 

 tive, it can not be couscimiaJ}) pii rpn..; r, . .\--niniii-- llial 

 instinctive actions are perfornit'il (•(.n-cicu.-lx , .-it all, 

 which soine wonhl p("rha])s <h'ny, it is not likely that any- 

 thinu' l)c>(ni(l llir in'xt snccccdiiig stop in the series is at 

 an>- nionicnt jircscnt to consciousness. The biological 

 meaning the entire pei-formance (say the building of 



8 Hodgson, quoted by James ("Principles of Psychology, " Vol. I, p. 589). 



