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for on those words the whole argument depends; 

 it is not indeed the usual place for words of con- 

 sequence ; but as the assertion they contain is, 

 to say the least, very questionable, it might per- 

 * haps be thought more likely to pass off, by ap- 

 pearing to be said merely par pa re nth ese. Now 

 if in speaking of other objects, I were to say that 

 Cadeiidris or Ben-Lomond were comparatively 

 small mountains, L should mean, and probably be 

 so understood, when compaied with the Alps, 

 Andes, &c. but Mr. Knight, in the same spirit 

 in which he has argued, might say, " Compared 

 with Mont Blanc, or Mount St. Elias, they cer- 

 tainly are small, but compared with any of the 

 mountains of Gi eat Britain (the proper object of 

 comparison,) they are by no means so ; and he 

 might perhaps discover, that though less lofty 

 than Suowdon or Ben-Nevis, their substructions, 

 their bases were more considerable, and contained 

 more solid yards. But in truth, this restriction of 

 Mr. Knight's, to one set of objects of his own 

 choosing for his own purpose, which does not 

 allow the author to know his own intention, and 

 would therefore on any occasion be very arbitrary, 

 is on this peculiarly unjust; as it excludes those 

 objects of comparison, which, according to the 

 whole spirit of Mr. Burke's doctrines, are the 

 most proper. Mr. Burke lias made greatness of 

 dimension a quality of the sublime, and one, 

 which when it happens to be united with those of 

 the beautiful, very much diminishes their effect ; 

 and he of course has made comparative smalltfess 



