No. .159] 



DOCTRINES HELD AS VITALISM 



ism of class A. Different grounds may be urged, and 

 have been urged, for making a deep-lying distinction be- 

 tween the living and non-living ; we shall take up the main 

 classes of these. 



" Descriptive" Vitalism 

 D. 9. Descriptive and more or less superficial differ- 

 ences of course exist between the living and the non-liv- 

 ing; this is the basis for distinguishing "biology" from 

 " physics" or " geology." The question of vitalism is, 

 whether there are deeper lying distinctions than those so 

 expressed, such as to require the division of science into 

 two contrasted parts, vitalistic and non-vitalistic. Many 

 distinctions may be admitted to exist, and to be of inter- 

 est, without their being considered ground for such a di- 

 vision of science. 



10. It is of course difficult or impossible to state a 

 priori what sort of a difference would be sufficient ground 

 for holding science divisible into two contrasted parts. 

 The following seem to be fair propositions*: (1) The 

 burden of showing that there exists a difference of suffi- 

 cient depth to require the division of science into two 

 contrasted parts is upon those that make the positive 

 claim that there is such a difference; (2) the difference 

 must be one as to the nature and laws of the occurrences 

 in the two fields. 



11. The most plausible descriptive ground for vitalism 

 would be that which maintained that since living things 

 have consciousness, while others, so far as we know, do 

 not, we have here, eo ipso, a deep-lying difference be- 

 tween the two fields ; and this quite independently of the 

 question whether the activities of living things require 

 consciousness for their explanation. Besides the im- 

 possibility of demonstrating the presence of conscious- 

 ness in living thinga generally, and its absence in the 

 non-living, such vitalism appears quite sterile, since all 



consciousness. 



