No. 559] DOCTRINES HELD AS VITALISM 



403 



enrrenees in organisms and that for the inorganic. The 

 change of Driesch's views on this point is worth sketch 

 ing, as the type of the logical development of an attempt 

 to establish a valid difference in principle between the 

 living and the non-living. Driesch's earlier attempts in 

 this direction (in his "Die Biologie als selbstiindige 

 Grundwissenschaft" (1893), and the 1 ' Analytische 

 Theorie der Organisehen TCntwicklung" (1894)), con- 

 sisted in the advocacy of a "static teleology" for de- 

 velopment; holding that purposiveness is shown, but this 

 is "given" in the original structure of the egg, as that 

 of a machine may be said to be given in its structure. 

 But for the detailed analysis of the changes that occur, 

 in the egg as in the machine, he held that perceptual de- 

 termining conditions could be found for everything that 

 happens : 



We even expect from the future that these analyses will he constituted 



37. But later Driesch became convinced that by snch 

 a descriptive or static theory the autonomy of life proc- 

 esses is not demonstrated, and he thereupon turned to 

 an active or dynamic vitalism, in which the vital istic 

 agent alters the physical processes occurring. The steps 

 by which his opinion on this matter became changed are 

 fully and explicitly set forth in the paper on "Die 

 Maschinentheorie des Lebens" (1896) and that on "Die 

 Lokalisation morphogenetischer Vorgange" (1899). In 

 the former paper he remarks that in his earlier theoret- 

 ical papers, "I saw the specifically biological feature of 

 organic processes in a given order or structure, as I 

 called it; in something 'static'; biology was for me in 

 this sense tectonics. " 1 8 In the latter paper, after stating 

 this point again, he remarks, "I hardly need to empha- 

 size the fact that I have now abandoned this standpoint" 



