THE SECOND BOOK 299 



in the turn, so as it is the advantage of the weaker 

 creature. 



But yet further, this doctrine of Elenches hath a more 

 ample latitude and extent than is perceived ; namely, unto 

 divers parts of knowledge ; whereof some are laboured and 

 other omitted. f For first, I conceive (though it may seem 

 at first somewhat strange) that that part which is variably 

 referred sometimes to Logic sometimes to Metaphysic, 

 touching the common adjuncts of essences, is but an 

 elenche ; for the great sophism of all sophisms being equi- 

 vocation or ambiguity of words and phrase, specially 

 of such words as are most general and intervene .in every 

 inquiry, it seemeth to me that the true and fruitful use 

 (leaving vain subtleties and speculations) of tKe~"ihquiry 

 of majority, minority, priority, posteriority, identity, diver- 

 sity, possibility, act, totality, parts, existence, privation, and 

 the like, are but wise cautions against^n^iguities^of speech. 

 So again the distribution of things into certain tribes, 

 which we call categories or predicaments, are but cautions 

 against the confusion of definitions and divisions. J 



Secondly, there is a seducement that workeoi by the 

 strength of the impression and not by the subtlety of 

 the illaqueation ; not so much perplexing the reason as 

 overruling it by power of the imagination. But this part I 

 think more proper to handle when I shall speak of Rhetoric. 



But lastly, there is yet a much more important and 

 profound kind of fallacies in the mind of man, which I 

 find not observed or enquired at all, and think good to 

 place here, as that which of all others appertaineth most 

 to rectify judgment : the force whereof is such, as it doth 

 not dazzle or snare the understanding in some particulars, 

 but doth more generally and inwardly infect and corrupt 

 the state thereof. For the mind of man is far from the 

 nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein the beams of 

 things should reflect according to their true incidence; 

 nay, it is rather like an enchanted glass, full of superstition 

 and imposture, if it be not delivered and reduced. For 

 this purpose, let us consider the false appearances that are 

 imposed upon us by the general nature of the mind, 



