302 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING 



against these three false appearances I find altogether 

 deficient. 



There remaineth one part of judgment of great excel- 

 lency, which to mine understanding is so slightly touched, 

 as I may report that also deficient ; which is the application 

 of the differing kinds of proofs to the differing kinds of 

 subjects ; for there being but four kinds of demonstrations, 

 that is, by the immediate consent of the mind or sense ; by 

 induction ; by sophism ; and by congruity, which is that 

 which Aristotle calleth demonstration in orb or circle, and 

 not a notioribus ; every of these hath certain subjects in the 

 matter of sciences, in which respectively they have chiefest 

 use ; and certain other, from which respectively they ought 

 to be excluded : and the rigour and curiosity in requiring 

 the more severe proofs in some things, and chiefly the 

 facility in contenting ourselves with the more remiss proofs 

 De Anaio- m others, hath been amongst the greatest causes 

 giaDe- O f detriment and hindrance to knowledge. The 



monstratio- . . 



num. distributions and assignations of demonstrations, 

 according to the analogy of sciences, I note as deficient. 



The custody or retaining of knowledge is either in 

 Writing or Memory ; whereof Writing hath two parts, the 

 nature of the character, and the order of the entry. For 

 the art of characters, or other visible notes of words or 

 things, it hath nearest conjugation with grammar, and 

 therefore I refer it to the due place. For the disposition 

 and collocation of that knowledge which we preserve in 

 writing, it consisteth in a good digest of common-places ; 

 wherein I am not ignorant of the prejudice imputed to the 

 use of common-place books, as causing a retardation of 

 reading, and some sloth or relaxation of memory. But 

 because it is but a counterfeit thing in knowledges to be 

 forward and pregnant, except a man be deep and full, I hold 

 the entry of common-places to be a matter of great use and 

 essence in studying ; as that which assureth copie of inven- 

 tion, and contracteth judgment to a strength. But this is 

 true, that of the methods of common-places that I have 

 seen, there is none of any sufficient worth ; all of them 



