THE SECOND BOOK 303 



carrying merely the face of a school, and not of a world ; A^ 

 and referring to vulgar matters and pedantical divisions v 

 without all life or respect to action. 



For the other principal part of the custody of know- 

 ledge, which is Memory, I find that faculty in my judgment 

 weakly enquired of. An art there is extant of it ; but it 

 seemeth to me that there are better precepts than that art, 

 and better practices of that art than those received. It is 

 certain the art (as it is) may be raised to points of ostenta- 

 tion prodigious : but in use (as it is now managed) it is 

 barren ; not burdensome nor dangerous to natural memory, 

 as is imagined, but barren ; that is, not dexterous to be 

 applied to the serious use of business and occasions. And 

 therefore I make no more estimation of repeating a great 

 number of names or words upon once hearing, or the pour- 

 ing forth of a number of verses or rhymes ex tempore, or the 

 making of a satirical simile of every thing, or the turning 

 of every thing to a jest, or the falsifying or contradicting 

 of every thing by cavil, or the like, (whereof in the faculties 

 of the mind there is great copie, and such as by device and 

 practice may be exalted to an extreme degree of wonder,) 

 than I do of the tricks of tumblers, funambuloes, balad- 

 ines ; the one being the same in the mind that the other is 

 in the bod/ ; matters of strangeness without worthiness. 



This art of Memory is but built upon two intentions ; 

 the one Prenotion, the other Emblem. Prenotion dis- 

 chargeth the indefinite seeking of that we would remember, 

 and directeth us to seek in a narrow compass; that is, 

 somewhat that hath congruity with our place of memory. 

 Emblem reduceth conceits intellectual to images sensible, 

 which strike the memory more ; out of which axioms may 

 be drawn much better practique than that in use; and 

 besides which axioms, there are divers moe touching help 

 of memory, not inferior to them. But I did in the begin- 

 ning distinguish, not to report those things deficient, which 

 are but only ill managed. 



There remaineth the fourth kind of Rational Know- 

 ledge, which is transitive, concerning the expressing or 

 transferring our knowledge to others; which I will term 



