THE SECOND BOOK 307 



little other purpose. But let those which are skilful in 

 them judge whether I bring them in only for appearance, 

 cr whether in that which I speak of them (though in few 

 marks) there be not some seed of proficience. And this 

 must be remembered, that as there be many of great 

 account in their countries and provinces, which when they 

 come up to the Seat of the Estate are but of mean rank 

 and scarcely regarded ; so these arts being here placed with 

 the principal and supreme sciences, seem petty things ; yet 

 to such as have chosen them to spend their studies in 

 them, they seem great matters. 



For the Method of Tradition, I see it hath moved a 

 controversy in our time. But as in civil business, if there 

 be a meeting and men fall at words there is commonly an 

 end of the matter for that time and no proceeding at all ; 

 so in learning, where there is much controversy there is 

 many times little inquiry. For this part of knowledge 

 of Method seemeth to me so weakly enquired as I shall 

 report it deficient. 



Method hath been placed, and that not amiss, in Logic, 

 as a part of Judgment : for as the doctrine of Syllogisms 

 comprehendeth the rules of judgment upon that which is 

 invented, so the doctrine of Method containeth the rules 

 of judgment upon that which is to be delivered ; for judg- 

 ment precedeth Delivery, as it folio weth Invention. 

 Neither is the method or the nature of the tradition material 

 only to the use of knowledge, but likewise to the progres- 

 sion of knowledge : for since the labour and life of one 

 man cannot attain to perfection of knowledge, the wis- 

 dom of the Tradition is that which inspireth the felicity of 

 continuance and proceeding. And therefore the most real 

 diversity of method is of method referred to Use, and 

 method referred to Progression ; whereof the one may be 

 termed Magistral, and the other of Probation. 



The later whereof seemeth to be via deserta et inter clusa. 

 For as knowledges are now delivered, there is a kind of 

 contract of error between the deliverer and the receiver : 

 for he that delivereth knowledge desireth to deliver it in 

 such form as may be best believed, and not as may be 



