THE SECOND BOOK 311 



judged. So in divine learning we see how frequent 

 Parables and Tropes are : for it is a rule, * That whatso- 

 ever science is not consonant to presuppositions, must pray 

 in aid of similitudes.' 



There be also other diversities of Methods, vulgar and ~ 

 received; as that of Resolution or Analysis, of Constitution 

 or Systasis, of Concealment or Cryptic, etc. which I do 

 allow well of ; though I have stood upon those which are 

 least handled and observed. All which I have Depmdentia 

 remembered to this purpose, because I would erect Traditionis < 

 and constitute one general inquiry, which seems to me 

 deficient, touching the Wisdom of Tradition. 



But unto this part of knowledge concerning Method 

 doth further belong not only the Architecture of the whole 

 frame of a work, but also the several beams and columns 

 thereof; not as to their stuff, but as to their quantity and 

 figure ; and therefore Method considereth not only the 

 disposition of the Argument or Subject, but likewise the 

 Propositions; not as to their truth or matter, but as to 

 their limitation and manner. For herein Ramus merited 

 better a great deal in reviving the good rules of Propo- 

 sitions, KaOoXov Trparov, Kara Trai/re?, etc. than he did in 

 introducing the canker of Epitomes ; and yet (as it is the 

 condition of human things that, according to the ancient 

 fables, * The most precious things have the most pernicious 

 keepers ; ) it was so, that the attempt of the one made him 

 fall upon the other. For he had need be well conducted 

 that should design to make Axioms convertible, if he make 

 them not withal circular, and non-promoven^ or incurring 

 into themselves : but yet the intention was excellent. 



The other considerations of Method concerning Propo- 

 sitions are chiefly touching the utmost propositions, which 

 limit the dimensions of sciences ; for every knowledge may 

 be fitly said, besides the profundity, (which is the truth 

 and substance of it, that makes it solid,) to have a longi- 

 tude and a latitude ; accounting the latitude towards other 

 sciences, and the longitude towards action ; that is, from 

 the greatest generality to the most particular precept : 

 the one giveth rule how far one knowledge ought to 



