THE SECOND BOOK 315 



doctrines of contraries are the same, though the use be 

 opposite. It appeareth also that Logic difTereth from 

 Rhetoric, not only as the fist from the palm, the one 

 close the other at large ; but much more in this, that Logic 

 handleth reason exact and in truth, and Rhetoric handleth 

 it as it is planted in popular opinions and manners. And 

 therefore Aristotle doth wisely place Rhetoric as between 

 Logic on the one side and moral or civil knowledge on the 

 other, as participating of both : for the proofs and demon- 

 strations of Logic are toward all men indifferent and the 

 same; but the proofs and persuasions of Rhetoric ought 

 to differ according to the auditors : 



Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas Arion : 



which application, in perfection of idea, ought to extend so 

 far, that if a man should speak of the same thing to 

 several persons, he should speak to them all respectively 

 and several ways : though this politic part of eloquence in 

 private speech it is easy for the greatest orators to want, 

 whilst by the observing their well-graced forms of Depru- 

 speech they leese the volubility of application : and ^ispn' 

 therefore it shall not be amiss to recommend vati - 

 this to better inquiry ; not being curious whether we place 

 it here, or in that part which concerneth policy. 



Now therefore will I descend to the deficiences, which 

 (as I said) are but attendances : and first, I do not find the 

 wisdom and diligence of Aristotle well pursued, who began 

 to make a collection of the popular signs and 

 colours of good and evil, both simple and com- Jfo 

 parative, which are as the Sophisms of Rhetoric 

 (as I touched before). For example : 



SOPHISMA. 



Quod laudatur^ bonum : quod vituperatur, malum. 



REDARGUTIO. 



Laudat v en ales qui vult extruder e merces. 

 Malum est, malum est> inquit emptor: sed cum recesserit^ turn 

 gloriabitur. 



