THE SECOND BOOK 339 



be fitly said, that the mind in the nature thereof would 

 be temperate and stayed, if the affections, as winds, did 

 not put it into tumult and perturbation. And here again 

 I find strange, as before, that Aristotle should have 

 written divers volumes of Ethics, and never handled the 

 affections, which is the principal subject thereof; and yet 

 in his Rhetorics, where they are considered but collaterally 

 and in a second degree (as they may be moved by speech), 

 he findeth place for them, and handleth them well for 

 the quantity ; but where their true place is, he preter- 

 mitteth them. For it is not his disputations about 

 pleasure and pain that can satisfy this inquiry, no more 

 than he that should generally handle the nature of light 

 can be said to handle the nature of colours ; for pleasure 

 and pain are to the particular affections as light is to 

 particular colours. Better travails I suppose had the Stoics 

 taken in this argument, as far as I can gather by that 

 which we have at second hand: but yet it is like it 

 was after their manner, rather in subtlety of definitions 

 (which in a subject of this nature are but curiosities) than 

 in active and ample descriptions and observations. So 

 likewise I find some particular writings of an elegant 

 nature touching some of the affections ; as of anger, of 

 comfort upon adverse accidents, of tenderness of counten- 

 ance, and other. But the poets and writers of histories 

 are the best doctors of this knowledge ; where we may 

 find painted forth with great life, how affections are 

 kindled and incited ; and how pacified and refrained ; and 

 how again contained from act and further degree ; how 

 they disclose themselves, how they work, how they vary, 

 how they gather and fortify, how they are inwrapped one 

 within another, and how they do fight and encounter one 

 with another, and other the like particularities : amongst 

 the which this last is of special use in moral and civil 

 matters ; how (I say) to set affection against affection, and 

 to master one by another ; even as we use to hunt beast 

 with beast and fly bird with bird, which otherwise percase 

 we could not so easily recover : upon which foundation 

 is erected that excellent use of praemium and poena y 



