iSo ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [Eook 



The knowledge which respecteth the faculities of the mind of 

 man, is of two kinds ; the one respecting his understanding and 

 reason, and the other his will, appetite, and affection ; whereof the 

 former produceth direction or decree, the latter action or execution. 

 It is true that the imagination is an agent or nuncius in both pro 

 vinces, both the judicial and the ministerial. For sense sendeth over 

 to imagination before reason have judged, and reason sendeth over 

 to imagination before the decree can be acted : for imagination ever 

 precedeth voluntary motion, saving that this Janus of imagination 

 hath differing faces ; for the face towards reason hath the print of 

 truth, but the face towards action hath the print of good, which never 

 theless are faces, 



Quales dccet esse sororum; 



Neither is the imagination simply and only a messenger, but is in 

 vested with, or at leastwise ursurpeth no small authority in itself, 

 besides the duty of the message. For it was well said by Aristotle, 

 &quot; That the mind hath over the body that commandment, which the 

 lord hath over a bondman ; but that reason hath over the imagination 

 that commandment, which a magistrate hath over a free citizen,&quot; who 

 may come also to rule in his turn. For we see that, in matters of 

 faith and religion, we raise our imagination above our reason, which is 

 the cause why religion sought ever access to the mind by similitudes, 

 types, parables, visions, dreams. And again, in all persuasions, that 

 are wrought by eloquence, and other impressions of like nature, which 

 do paint and disguise the true appearance of things, the chief recom 

 mendation unto reason is from the imagination. Nevertheless, 

 because I find not any science that doth properly or fitly pertain to 

 the imagination, I see no cause to alter the former division. For as 

 for poesy, it is rather pleasure, or play of imagination, than a work or 

 duty thereof. And if it be a work, we speak not now of such parts cf 

 learning as the imagination produceth, out of such sciences as handle 

 and consider of the imagination ; no more than we shall speak now of 

 such knowledges as reason produceth, for that extendcth to all philo 

 sophy, but of such knowledges as do handle and inquire of the faculty 

 of reason ; so as poesy had its true place. As for the power of the 

 imagination in nature, and the manner of fortifying the same, we have 

 mentioned it in the doctrine &quot; De anima,&quot; whereunto most fitly it 

 belongeth : and lastly for imaginative or insinuative reason, which is 

 the subject of rhetoric, we think it best to refer it to the arts of reason. 

 So therefore we content ourselves with the former division, that 

 Human Philosophy, which respecteth the faculties of the mind of man, 

 hath two parts, Rational and Moral. 



The part of Human Philosophy which is rational, is of all know 

 ledges, to the most wits, the least delightful, and scemeth but a net of 

 subtilty and spinosity : for as it was truly said, that knowledge is 

 &quot; pabulum animi ; &quot; so in the nature of men s appetite to this food, 

 most men are of the taste and stomach of the Israelites in the desert, 

 that would fain have returned &quot;ad ollas carnium,&quot; and were weary of 



