184 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [Book 



sincerely : for that all those which excelled in copy of speech, seem 

 to have chosen that sect as that which was fittest to give glory 

 to their eloquence, and variable discourses ; being rather like pro 

 gresses of pleasure, than journeys to an end. But assuredly many 

 scattered in both academics did hold it in subtilty and integrity. But 

 here was their chief error ; they charged the deceit upon the senses, 

 which in my judgment, notwithstanding all their cavillations, are very 

 sufficient to certify and report truth, though not always immediately, 

 yet by comparison, by help of instrument, and by producing and 

 urging such things as are too subtile for the sense, to some effect com 

 prehensible by the sense, and other like assistance. But they ought to 

 have charged the deceit upon the weakness of the intellectual powers, 

 and upon the manner of collecting and concluding upon the reports of 

 the senses. This I speak not to disable the mind of man, but to stir it 

 up to seek help : for no man, be he never so cunning or practised, 

 can make a straight line or perfect circle by steadiness of hand, which 

 may be easily done by help of a ruler or compass. 



This part of invention, concerning the invention of sciences, I pur 

 pose, if God give me leave, hereafter to propound, having digested it 

 into two parts ; whereof the one I term experientia literata, and the 

 other interpretatio natures : the former being but a degree and rudi 

 ment of the latter. But I will not dwell too long, nor speak too great 

 upon a promise. 



The invention of speech or argument is not properly an invention : 

 for to invent, is to discover that we know not, and not to recover or 

 rcsummon that which we already know, and the use of this invention 

 is no other, but out of the knowledge, whereof our mind is already 

 possessed, to draw forth or call before us that which may be pertinent 

 to the purpose which we take into our consideration. So as, to speak 

 truly, it is no invention, but a remembrance or suggestion, with an 

 application ; which is the cause why the schools do place it after judg 

 ment, as subsequent and not precedent. Nevertheless, because we 

 do account it a chace, as well of deer in an enclosed park, as in a 

 forest at large, and that it hath already obtained the name ; let it be 

 called invention, so as it be perceived and discerned that the scope 

 and end of this invention is readiness and present use of our know 

 ledge, and not addition or amplification thereof. 



To procure this ready use of knowledge there are two courses, pre 

 paration and suggestion. The former of these scemeth scarcely apart of 

 knowledge, consisting rather of diligence than of any artificial erudition. 

 And herein Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully, doth deride the sophists near 

 his time, saying, &quot;They did as if one that professed the art of shoe- 

 making should not teach how to make up a shoe, but only exhibit in a 



readiness a number of shoes of all fashions and sizes.&quot; But yet a man 

 might IC ply, that if a shoemaker should have no shoes in his shop, but 

 only work as he is bespoken, he should be weakly customed. But 

 Saviour, speaking of divine knowledge, saith, &quot;that the kingdoi 



our 

 dom of 



heaven is like a good householder, that bringeth forth both new and 

 u store :&quot; and we see the ancient writers of rhetoric do give it in pie- 



