iS6 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [Book 



into questions or places of inquiry, we do greatly advance our 

 pursuit. 



Now we pass unto the arts of judgment, which handle the natures 

 of proofs and demonstrations, which as to induction hath a coincidence 

 with invention : for in all inductions, whether in good or vicious form, 

 the same action of the mind which inventcth, judgeth ; all one as in 

 the sense: but otherwise it is in proof by syllogism ; for the proof being 

 not immediate, but by mean, the invention of the mean is one thing, 

 and the judgment of the consequence is another ; the one exciting 

 only, the other examining. Therefore, for the real and exact form of 

 judgment, we refer ourselves to that which we have spoken of inter 

 pretation of nature. 



For the other judgment by syllogism, as it is a thing most agreeable 

 to the mind of man, so it hath been vehemently and excellently 

 laboured . for the nature of man doth extremely covet to have some 

 what in his understanding fixed and unmoveable, and as a rest and 

 support of the mind. And therefore as Aristotle endeavoureth to 

 prove, that in all motion there is some point quiescent ; and as he 

 elegantly expoundeth the ancient fable of Atlas, that stood fixed, and 

 bare up the heaven from falling, to be meant of the poles or axle-tree 

 of heaven, whereupon the conversion is accomplished; so assuredly 

 men have a desire to have an Atlas or axle-tree within, to keep them 

 from fluctuation, which is like to a perpetual peril of falling ; therefore 

 men did hasten to set down some principles about which the variety 

 of their disputations might turn. 



So then this art of judgment is but the reduction of propositions 

 to principles in a middle term. The principles to be agreed by all, 

 and exempted from argument : the middle term to be elected at the 

 liberty of every man s invention: the reduction to be of two kinds, 

 direct and inverted ; the one when the proposition is reduced to the 

 principle, which they term a probation ostensive ; the other, when the 

 contradictory of the proposition is reduced to the contradictory of the 

 principle, which is that which they call per incommoditm, or pressing 

 an absurdity ; the number of middle terms to be as the proposition 

 standcth degrees more or less removed from the principle. 



But this art hath two several methods of doctrine, the one by way 

 of direction, the other by way of caution ; the former frameth and 

 scttcth down a true form of consequence, by the variations and deflec 

 tions from which errors and inconsequences may be exactly judged. 

 Toward the composition and structure of which form it is incident to 

 handle the parts thereof, which are propositions, and the parts of 

 propositions, which are simple words ; and this is that part of logic 

 which is comprehended in the analytics. 



The second method of doctrine was introduced for expedite use 

 and assurance sake discovering the more subtile forms of sophisms 

 and illaqueations, with their redargutions, which is that which is 

 termed Blenches. For although in the more gross sorts of fallacies it 

 happeneth, as Seneca maketh the comparison well, as in juggling 

 feats, which though we know not how they are done, yet; we know 



