II.] ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 187 



well it is not as it sccmeth to be, yet the more subtile sort of them 

 cloth not only put a man besides his answer, but doth many times 

 abuse his judgment. 



This part concerning Elenches is excellently handled by Aristotle 

 in precept, but more excellently by Plato in example ; not only in the 

 persons of the sophists, but even in Socrates himself, who professing 

 to affirm nothing, but to infirm that which was affirmed by another, 

 hath exactly expressed all the forms of objection, fallacy, and rcdar- 

 gution. And although we have said that the use of this doctrine is 

 for redargution ; yet it is manifest, the degenerate and corrupt use is 

 for caption and contradiction, which passeth for a great faculty, and 

 no doubt is of very great advantage, though the difference be good 

 which was made between orators and sophisters, that the one is as 

 the greyhound, which hath his advantage in the race, and the other 

 as the hare, which hath her advantage in the turn, so as it is the 

 advantage of the weaker creature. 



But yet farther, this doctrine of Elenches hath a more ample 

 latitude and extent, than is perceived ; namely, unto divers parts of 

 knowledge ; whereof some are laboured, and others omitted. For 

 first, I conceive, though it may seem at first somewhat strange, that 

 that part which is variably referred, sometimes to logic, sometimes to 

 metaphysic, touching the common adjuncts of essences, is but an 

 Elenche ; for the great sophism of all sophisms being equivocation 

 or ambiguity of words and phrase, especially of such words as are 

 most general and intervene in every inquiry ; it secmcth to me that 

 the true and fruitful uses, leaving vain subtiltics and speculations, of 

 the inquiry of majority, minority, priority, posteriority, identity, diver 

 sity, possibility, act, totality, parts, existence, privation, and the like, 

 arc but wise cautions against ambiguities of speech. So again, the 

 distribution of things into certain tribes, which we call categories or 

 predicaments, are but cautions against the confusion of definitions 

 and divisions. 



Secondly, there is a scducement that workcth by the strength of 

 the impression, and not by the subtilty of the illaqucation, not so 

 much perplexing the reason, as over-ruling it by power of the 

 imagination. But this part I think more proper to handle, when I 

 shall speak of rhetoric. 



But lastly, there is yet a much more important and profound kind 

 of fallacies in the mind of man, which I find not observed or inquired 

 at all, and think good to place here, as that which of all others appcr- 

 taineth most to rectify judgment : the force whereof is such, as it doth 

 not dazzle or snare the understanding in some particulars, but doth 

 more generally and inwardly infect and corrupt the state thereof. 

 For the mind of man is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass, 

 wherein the beams of things should reflect according to their true 

 incidence ; nay, it is rather like an enchanted glass, full of superstition 

 and imposture, if it be not delivered and reduced. For this purpose, 

 let us consider the- false appearances that are imposed upon us by the 

 general nature of the mind, beholding them in an example or two ; 



