II.] ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 189 



govern our words, and prescribe it well, u Loquendum ut vulgus. 

 sentiendum ut sapientes ;&quot; yet certain it is, that words, as a Tartar s 

 bow, do shoot back upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily 

 intangle and pervert the judgement ; so as it is almost necessary in all 

 controversies and disputations, to imitate the wisdom of the mathe 

 matics, in setting down in the very beginning the definitior.s of our 

 very words r.nd terms, that others may know how we accept and 

 understand them, and whether they concur with us or no. For it 

 cometh to pass, for want of this, that we are sure to end there where 

 we ought to have begun, which is in questions and differences about 

 words. To conclude therefore, it must be confessed that it is not 

 possible to divorce ourselves from these fallacies and false appearances, 

 because they arc inseparable from our nature and condition of life ; so 

 yet nevertheless the caution of them, (for all clenches, as was said, are 

 but cautions), doth extremely import the true conduct of human judg 

 ment. The particular clenches or cautions against these three false 

 appearances, I find altogether deficient. 



There remaineth one part of judgment of great excellency, which 

 to mine understanding is so slightly touched, as I may report thai also 

 deficient ; which is, the application of the differing kinds of proofs to 

 the differing kinds of subjects ; for there being but four kinds oi 

 demonstrations, that is, by the immediate consent of the mind or 

 sense, by induction, by syllogism, and by congruity ; which is that which 

 &quot;Aristotle calleth demonstration in orb, or circle, and not a notioribus; 

 every of these hath certain subjects in the matter of sciences, in which 

 respectively they have chiefest use; and certain others, from which 

 respectively they ought to be excluded, and the rigour and curiosity 

 in requiring the more severe proofs in some things, and chiefly the 

 facility in contenting ourselves with the more remiss proofs in others, 

 hath been amongst the greatest causes of detriment and hindrance 

 to knowledge. The distributions and assignations of demonstrations, 

 according to the analogy of sciences I note as deficient. 



The custody or retaining of knowledge is cither in writing or 

 memory ; whereof writing hath two parts, the nature of the character, 

 and the order of the entry : for the art of characters, or other visible notes 

 of words or things, it hath nearest conjugation with grammar ; and 

 therefore I refer it to the due place : for the disposition and collocation 

 of that knowledge which we preserve in writing, itconsisteth in a good 

 digest of common-places wherein I am not ignorant of the prejudice 

 imputed to the use of common-place books, as causing a retardation of 

 reading, and some sloth or relaxation of memory. But because it is 

 but a counterfeit thing in knowledges to be forward and pregnant, 

 except a man be deep and full, I hold the entry of common-places to 

 be a matter of great use and essence in studying, as that which assurcth 

 copy of invention, and contracteth judgment to a strength. But this is 

 true, that of the methods of common-places that I have seen, there is 

 none of any sufficient worth, all of them carrying merely the face of a 

 school, and not of a world, and referring to vulgar matters, and pcdan- 

 tical divisions, without all life, or respect to action. 



