II.) ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 195 



which is delivered ; for that knowledge which is new and foreign from 

 opinions received, is to be delivered in another form than that that is 

 agreeable and familiar ; and therefore Aristotle, when he thinks to tax 

 Deinocritus, doth in truth commend him, where he saith, &quot; If we shall 

 indeed dispute, and not follow after similitudes,&quot; etc. For those, whose 

 conceits are seated in popular opinions, need only but to prove or dis 

 pute ; but those whose conceits arc beyond popular opinions, have a 

 double labour ; the one to make themselves conceived, and the other to 

 prove and demonstrate : so that it is of necessity with them to have 

 recourse to similitudes and translations to express themselves. And 

 therefore in the infancy of learning, and in rude times, when those con 

 ceits which are now trivial were then new, the world was full uf parables 

 and similitudes ; for else would men either have passed over without 

 mark, or else rejected for paradoxes, that which was offered, before they 

 had understood or judged. So in divine learning, we see how frequent 

 parables and tropes are : for it is a rule, &quot; That whatsoever science is 

 not consonant to presuppositions, must pray in aid of similitudes.&quot; 



There be also other diversities of methods vulgar and received : 

 as that of resolution or analysis, of constitution or systasis, of conceal 

 ment or cryptic, etc., which i do allow well of, though I have stood upon 

 those which are least handled and observed. All which I have remem 

 bered to this purpose, because I would erect and constitute one general 

 inquiry, which seems to me deficient, touching the wisdom of tradition. 



But unto this part of knowledge concerning method, doth farther 

 belong, not only the architecture of a whole frame of work, but also 

 the several beams and columns thereof, not as to their stuff, but as 

 to their quantity and figure : and therefore method considcreth not 

 only the disposition of the argument or subject, but likewise the pro 

 positions ; not as to their truth or matter, but as to their limitation and 

 manner. For herein Ramus merited better a great deal in reviving the 

 good rules and propositions. Ka66\ou irpurov KOTO TOJ/T^J, etc. than he did 

 in introducing the canker of epitomes ; and yet, as it is the con 

 dition of human things, that, according to the ancient fables, &quot; The 

 most precious things have the most pernicious keepers;&quot; it was so, 

 that the attempt of the one made him fall upon the other. For he 

 had need be well conducted, that should design to make axioms 

 convertible ; if he make them not withal circular, and non promovent 

 cr incurring into themselves : but yet the intention was excellent. 



The other considerations of method concerning propositions arc 

 chiefly touching the utmost propositions, which limit the dimensions 

 of sciences ; for every knowledge may be fitly said, besides the pro 

 fundity, which is the truth and substance of it that makes it solid, to 

 have a longitude and a latitude, accounting the latitude towards other 

 sciences, and the longitude towards action ; that is, from the greatest 

 generality, to the most particular precept : The one giveth rule how 

 far one knowledge ought to intermeddle within the province of another 

 which is the rule they call nadavrt : the other giveth rule unto what 

 degree of particularity a knowledge should descend : which latter I find 

 passed over in silence, being in my judgment the more material : for ccr- 



