II. ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 97 



unfortunately built, as that those powers and arts should have force to 

 disturb reason, and not to establish and advance it ; for the end of 

 logic is to teach a form of argument to secure reason, and not to 

 entrap it. The end of morality, is to procure the affections to obey 

 reason, and not to invade it. The end of rhetoric, is to till the imagi 

 nation to second reason, and not to oppress it ; for these abuses of arts 

 come in but e.r obliquo for caution. 



And therefore it was great injustice in Plato, though springing out 

 of a just hatred of the rhetoricians of his time, to esteem of rhetoric 

 but as a voluptuary art, resembling it to cookery, that did mar whole 

 some meats, and help unwholesome by variety of sauces, to the plea 

 sure of the taste. For we see that speech is much more conversant in 

 adorning that which is good, than in colouring that which is evil ; for 

 there is no man but speakcth more honestly than he can do or think ; 

 and it was excellently noted by Thucydides in Cleon, that because he 

 used to hold on the bad side in causes of estate, therefore he was 

 ever inveighing against eloquence and good speech, knowing that no 

 man can speak fair of courses sordid and base. And therefore as 

 Plato said elegantly, &quot;That Virtue, if she could be seen, would move 

 great love and affection:&quot; so seeing that she cannot be showed to the 

 sense by corporal shape, the next degree is, to show her to the imagi 

 nation in lively representation : for to show her to reason only in sub- 

 tilty of argument, was a thing ever derided in Chrysippus, and many 

 of the Stoics, who thought to thrust virtue upon men by sharp disputa 

 tions and conclusions, which have no sympathy with the will of man. 



Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant and obedient to 

 reason, it were true, there should be no great use of persuasions and 

 insinuations to the will, more than of naked proposition and proofs : 

 but in regard of the continual mutinies and seditions of the affections, 



Video meliora, proboque ; 

 Dcteriora scquor ; 



Reason would become captive and servile, if eloquence of persuasions 

 did not practise and win the imagination from the affections part, and 

 contract a confederacy between the reason and imagination against the 

 affections ; for the affections themselves carry ever an appetite to 

 good, as reason doth. The difference is, that the affection beholdeth 

 merely the present, reason beholdeth the future and sum of time. 

 And therefore the present filling the imagination more, reason is 

 commonly vanquished ; but after that force of eloquence and persua 

 sion hath made things future and remote appear as present, then upon 

 the revolt of the imagination reason prevailctn. 



We conclude therefore, that rhetoric can be no more charged with 

 the colouring of the worst part, than logic with sophistry, or morality 

 with vice. For we know the doctrines of contraries arc the same, 

 though the use be opposite. It appcarcth also, that logic difiereth 

 from rhetoric, not only as the fist from the palm, the one close, the 

 other at large ; but much more in this, that logic handleth reason 

 exact, and in truth : and rhetoric handleth it as it is planted in popular 



