II.] ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 207 



means to exalt their nature, they are in a perpetual estuation to exalt 

 their place. So then passive good is, as was said, either conservative 

 or perfective. 



To resume the good of conservation or comfort, which consistcth 

 in the fruition of that which is agreeable to our natures ; it sccmeth to 

 be the most pure and natural of pleasures, but yet the softest and the 

 lowest. And this also recciveth a difference, which hath neither been 

 well judged of nor well inquired. For the good of fruition and content 

 ment, is placed either in the sinccrcncss of the fruition, or in the 

 quickness and vigour of it ; the one superinduced by equality, the other 

 by vicissitude ; the one having less mixture of evil, the other more 

 impression of good. Whether of these is the greater good, is a ques 

 tion controverted ; but whether man s nature may not be capable o/ 

 both, is a question not inquired. 



The former question being debated between Socrates and a sophist, 

 Socrates placing felicity in an equal and constant peace of mind, and 

 the sophist in much desiring and much enjoying, they fell from argu 

 ment to ill words : the sophist saying that Socratcs s felicity was the 

 felicity of a block or stone; and Socrates saying that the sophist s 

 felicity was the felicity of one that had the itch, who did nothing but 

 itch and scratch. And both these opinions do not want their supports : 

 for the opinion of Socrates is much upheld by the general consent even 

 of the Epicures themselves, that virtue bcarcth a great part in felicity : 

 and if so, certain it is, that virtue hath more use in clearing perturba 

 tions, than in compassing desires. The sophist s opinion is much 

 favoured by the assertion we last spake of, that good of advancement 

 is greater than good of simple preservation ; because every obtaining 

 a desire hath a show of advancement, as motion though in a circle 

 hath a show of progression. 



But the second question decided the true way makcth the former 

 superfluous : for can it be doubted but that there arc some who take 

 more pleasure in enjoying pleasures, than some other, and yet never 

 theless arc less troubled with the loss or leaving of them : so as this 

 same, &quot; Non uti, ut non appctas ; non appetcre, ut non metuas; sunt 

 animi pusilli et diffidcntis.&quot; And it seemeth to me that most of the 

 doctrines of the philosophers are more fearful and cautionary than the 

 nature of things requireth : so have they increased the fear of death in 

 offering to cure it : for when they would have a man s whole life to be 

 but a discipline or preparation to die, they must needs make men think 

 that it is a terrible CHcmy against whom there is no end of prepar 

 ing. Better saith the poet, 



Qui fmcm vitce cxtremum inter muncra ponat 

 Naturae : 



So have they sought to make men s minds too uniform and harmonica!, 

 by not breaking them sufficiently to contrary motions: the reason 

 whereof I suppose to be, because they themselves were men dedicated 

 to a private, free, and unapplied course of life. For as we see, upon 

 the lute or like instrument, a ground, though it be sweet and havo 



