II.] ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 



torn ; using for example, that if a stone be thrown ten thousand times 

 up, it will not learn to ascend, and that by often seeing or hearing, we 

 do not learn to hear or see the better. For though this principle be 

 true in things wherein nature is peremptory, the reason whereof we can 

 not now stand to discuss, yet it is otherwise in things wherein nature 

 admitteth a latitude. For he might see that a straight glove will come 

 more easily on with use ; and that a wand will by use bend otherwise 

 than it grew ; and that by use of the voice we speak louder and stronger ; 

 and that by use of enduring heat or cold, we endure it the better, and 

 the like ; which latter sort have a nearer resemblance unto that subject 

 of manners he handlcth, than those instances which he alledgeth. But 

 allowing his conclusion, that virtues and vices consist in habit, he 

 ought so much the more to have taught the manner of superinducing 

 that habit : for there be many precepts of the wise ordering the exer 

 cises of the mind, as there is of ordering the exercises of the body, 

 whereof we will recite a few. 



The first shall be, that we beware we take not at the first cither too 

 high a strain, or too weak : for if too high in a diffident nature you dis 

 courage ; in a confident nature you breed an opinion of facility, and so 

 a sloth : and in all natures you breed a farther expectation than can 

 hold out, and so an insatisfaction in the end: if too weak of the other 

 side, you may not look to perform and overcome any great task. 



Another precept is, to practise all things chiefly at two several 

 times, the one when the mind is best disposed, the other when it is 

 worst disposed ; that by the one you may give a great step, by the 

 other you may work out the knots and stonds of the mind, and make 

 the middle times the more easy and pleasant. 



Another precept is that which Aristotle mentioncth by the way, 

 which is, It) bear ever towards the contrary extreme of that whercunto 

 we are by nature inclined : like unto the rowing against the stream, or 

 making a wand straight, by binding him contrary to his natural 

 crookedness. 



Another precept is, that the mind is brought to anything better, 

 and with more sweetness and happiness, if that whereunto you pretend 

 be not first in the intention, but tanquam aliud agcndo, because of the 

 natural hatred of the mind against necessity and constraint. Many 

 other axioms there are touching the managing of exercise and custom ; 

 which being so conducted, doth prove indeed another nature ; but being 

 governed by chance, doth commonly prove but an ape of nature, and 

 bringeth forth that which is lame and counterfeit. 



So if we should handle books and studies, and what influence and 

 operation they have upon manners, are there not divers precepts of 

 great caution and direction appertaining thereunto? Did not one of 

 the fathers in great indignation call poesy vinnm dtniwnnin, because it 

 incrcascth temptations, perturbations, and vain opinions ? Is not the 

 opinion of Aristotle worthy to be regarded, wherein he saith, &quot; That 

 young men arc no fit auditors of moral philosophy, because they are 

 not settled from the boiling heat of their affections, nor attempered 

 with time and experience?&quot; And doth it not hereof come, that those 



