340 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [Cook 



reason, sense, induction, argument, according to the laws of heaven 

 and cnrth ; the other, that which is imprinted upon the spirit of man 

 by an inward instinct, according to the law of conscience, which is a 

 sparkle of the purity of his first estate : in which latter sense only he 

 is participant, of some light and discerning touching the perfection of 

 the moral law : but how ? Sufficient to check the vice, but not to 

 inform the duty. So then the doctrine of religion, as well moral as 

 mystical, is nottobe attained,but by inspiration andrevelation from God. 



The use, notwithstanding, of reason, in spiritual things, and the 

 latitude thereof, is very great and general ; for it is not for nothing that 

 the apostle calleth religion our reasonable service of God, insomuch as 

 the very ceremonies and figures of the old law were full of reason 

 and signification, much more than the ceremonies of idolatry and 

 magic, that are full of non-significants and surd characters. But most 

 especially the Christian faith, as in all things, so in this, deserveth to 

 be highly magnified, holding and preserving the golden mediocrity in 

 this point, between the law of the heathen, and the law of Mahomet, 

 which have embraced the two extremes. For the religion of the 

 heathen had no constant belief or confession, but left all to the liberty 

 of argument : and the religion of Mahomet, on the other side, inter- 

 dicteth argument altogether: the one having the very face of error, 

 and the other of imposture; whereas the faith doth both admit and 

 reject disputation with difference. 



The use of human reason in religion is of two sorts : the former, in 

 the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God to us 

 revealed ; the other, in the inferring and deriving of doctrine and 

 direction thereupon. The former extendeth to the mysteries them 

 selves ; but how ? By way of illustration, and not by way of argument. 

 The latter consisteth indeed of probation and argument. In the 

 former, we see, God vouchsafeth to descend to our capacity, in the 

 expressing of his mysteries in sort as may be sensible unto us ; and 

 doth graft his revelations and holy doctrine upon the notions of our 

 reason, and applieth his inspirations to open our understanding, as the 

 form of the key to the ward of the lock. For the latter there is allowed 

 us an use of reason and argument, secondary and respective, although 

 not original and absolute. For after the articles and principles of 

 religion are placed and exempted from examination of reason, it is 

 then permitted unto us to make derivations and inferences from, and 

 according to the analogy of them, for our better direction. In nature 

 this holdeth not, for both the principles arc cxaminable by induction, 

 though not by a medium or syllogism; and besides, those principles 

 or first positions have no discordance with that reason, which drawcth 

 down and deduceth the inferior positions. But yet it holdeth not in 

 religion alone, but in many knowledges, both of greater and smaller 

 nature, namely, wherein there are not only posita but placita; for in 

 such there can be no use of absolute reason : we see it familiarly in 

 games of wit, as chess, or the like ; the draughts and first laws of the 

 game are positive, but how? merely ad placitum, and not examinable 

 by reason : but then how to direct our play thereupon with best 



