298 NOVUM ORGANUM. 



also, after all this stir and trouble, shall arrive at some one of those 

 systems of Philosophies which prevailed among the ancients. For 

 they too, in the outset of their reflections, prepared a great store and 

 abundance of examples and particulars, and digested them into common 

 place books, under heads and titles, and from these composed their 

 Philosophies and Arts ; and afterwards, when the subject was 

 thoroughly known, pronounced judgment, occasionally adding 

 examples for confirmation and illustration ; but thought it superfluous 

 and troublesome to publish their notes of particulars, their minutes, 

 and common-place books, and therefore followed the example of 

 builders, who remove their scaffolding and ladders out of sight as 

 soon as the building is finished. Nor may we refuse to believe that 

 they did so. But unless what has been said above be entirely 

 forgotten, it will be easy to answer this objection, or rather scruple. 

 For that the ancients had a form of inquiring and discovering we 

 ourselves allow, and the fact appears on the face of their writings. 

 But their form was simply this. From certain examples and particu 

 lars (with the addition of common notions, and perhaps of some 

 portion of the received opinions which were most popular) they flew 

 to the most general conclusions or principles of Science ; and, treat 

 ing the truth of these as fixed and immovable, they deduced and 

 proved inferior conclusions by means of intermediate propositions, 

 and out of these they constructed their art. And then, if new par 

 ticulars and examples were mooted and adduced which contradicted 

 their conclusions, they either craftily reduced them to order by means 

 of distinctions or explanations of their rules, or else got rid of them 

 in the gross by means of exceptions ; while to such particulars as 

 were not contradictory they pertinaciously laboured to accommodate 

 causes in conformity with their own principles. But this Natural 

 History and Experience was far from what it ought to be; and that 

 flying off to the highest generalities ruined everything. 



cxxvi. Again, it will be objected, that, in prohibiting the passing a 

 judgment and the laying down of fixed principles, until the highest 

 generalities have been arrived at by the intermediate steps, we are 

 defending a suspension of judgment and leading to Acatalepsy. But 

 what we contemplate and propound is not Acatalepsy, but the 

 reverse ; for instead of derogating from the sense, we minister to it ; 

 and in place of slighting the Intellect, we regulate it. And it is better 

 to know all that we need, and yet think that we do not know every 

 thing, than to think that we know everything, and yet know nothing 

 that is needful. 



cxxvii. Moreover, some will ask, by way of doubting rather than of 

 objecting, whether we intend Natural Philosophy only, or other Sciences 

 as well Logic, Ethics, and Politics to be carried out by this method 

 of ours. Now, we certainly understand that what we have said holds 

 universally, and just as the common Logic, which regulates matters 

 by syllogism, belongs not only to the natural, but to all Sciences ; so 

 also our method, which proceeds by Induction, embraces all subjects. 

 For we form a History and Tables of discovery for anger, fear, shame, 





