CtiXA T hVSTA L RA T1ON. 409 



in that they agree : but the difference betwixt them consists in three 

 things, viz., the end, the order of demonstrating, and the grounds of 

 inquiry. 



The end of our new logic is to find, not arguments, but arts ; not 

 what agrees with principles, but principles themselves : not probable 

 reasons, but plans and designs of works a different intention pro 

 ducing a different effect. In one the adversary is conquered by dispute, 

 and in the other nature by works. The nature and order of the 

 demonstrations agree with this object. For in common logic, almost 

 our whole labour is spent upon the syllogism. Logicians hitherto 

 appear scarcely to have noticed induction, passing it over with some 

 slight comment. JJut we reject the syllogistic method as being too 

 confused, and allowing nature to escape out of our hands. For though 

 nobody can doubt that those things which agree with the middle term 

 agree with each other, nevertheless, there is this source of error, that 

 a syllogism consists of propositions, propositions of words, and words 

 are but the token and signs of things. Now, if the first notions, 

 which are, as it were, the soul of words, and the basis of every philo 

 sophical fabric, are hastily abstracted from things, and vague and not 

 clearly defined and limited, the whole structure falls to the ground. 

 We therefore reject the syllogism, and that not only as regards first 

 principles, to which logicians do not apply them, but also with respect 

 to intermediate propositions, which the syllogism contrives to manage 

 in such a way as to render barren in effect, unfit for practice, and 

 clearly unstated to the active branch of the sciences. Nevertheless, we 

 would leave to the syllogism, and such celebrated and applauded 

 demonstrations, their jurisdiction over popular and speculative acts; 



while, in everything relating to the nature of things, we make use of 



both our major 

 imluf lion as that form of demonstration uhi. h &amp;lt; ]&amp;lt;&amp;gt; &amp;lt;-s in upon natuie 



induction for both our major and minor propositions ; for we consider 



and presses on, and, as it were, mixes itself with action. Whence the 

 common order of demonstrating is absolutely inverted ; for instead of 

 flying immediately from the senses, and particulars, to generals, as to 

 certain fixed poles, about which disputes always turn, and deriving 

 others from these by intermediates, in a short, indeed, but precipitate 

 manner, fit for controversy, but unlit to close with nature; we con 

 tinually raise up propositions by degrees, and in the last place, 

 come to the most general axioms, which are not notional, but well 

 defined, and what nature allows of, as entering into the very essence 

 of things. 



I5ut the more difficult part of our task consists in the form of induc 

 tion, and the judgment to be made by it ; for that form of the logicians 

 which proceeds by simple enumeration, is a childish thing, concludes 

 unsafely, lies open to contradictory instances, and regards only 

 common matters ; yet determines nothing : whilst the sciences require 

 such a form of induction, as can separate, adjust, and verify ex 

 perience, and come to a necessary determination by proper exclusions 

 and rejections. 



Nor is this all { for we likewise lay the foundations of the sciences 



