GKEA T INS TA UK A T/OM 4 1 1 



sprout out from the rankncss of the soil : and, on the other hand, to 

 establish this for ever, that the understanding can make no judgment 

 but by induction, and the just form thereof. Whence the doctrine of 

 purging the understanding requires three kinds of confutations, to fit 

 it for the investigation of truth ; viz., the confutation of philosophies, 

 the confutation of demonstrations, and the confutation of the natural 

 reason. But when these have been completed, and it has been clearly 

 seen what results are to be expected from the nature of things, and the 

 nature of the human mind, we shall have then furnished a nuptial 

 couch for the mind and the universe, the divine goodness being our 

 bridemaid. And let it be the prayer of our Kpithalamium, that 

 assistance to man may spring from this union, and a race of dis 

 coveries, which wiH contribute to his wants and vanquish his miseries. 

 And this is the second part of the work. 



But as we propose not only to pave and show the way, but also to 

 tread in it oursiclvcs, we shall next exhibit the phenomena of the 

 universe ; that is, such experience of all kinds, and such a natural 

 history, as may afford a foundation to philosophy. For as no fine 

 method of demonstration, or form of explaining nature, can preserve 

 the mind from error, and support it from falling ; so neither can it 

 hence receive any matter of science. Those, therefore, who determine 

 not to conjecture and guess, but to find out and know ; not to invent 

 fables and romances of worlds, but to look into and dissect the nature 

 of this real world, must consult only things themselves. Nor can any 

 force of genius, thought, or argument, be substituted for this labour, 

 search, and inspection ; not even though all the wits of men were 

 united : this, therefore, must either be had, or the business be deserted 

 for ever. 



But the conduct of mankind has hitherto been such, that it is no 

 wonder nature has not opened herself to them. For the information 

 of the senses is treacherous and deceitful ; observation careless, 

 irregular, and accidental ; tradition idle, rumorous, and vain ; practice 

 narrow and servile ; experience blind, stupid, vague, and broken ; and 

 natural history extremely light and empty : wretched materials for the 

 understanding to fashion into philosophy and the sciences ! Then 

 comes in a preposterous subtilty of argumentation and sifting, as a 

 last remedy, that mends not the matter one jot, nor separates the 

 errors. Whence there are absolutely no hopes of enlarging and 

 promoting the sciences, without rebuilding them. 



The first materials for this purpose must be taken from a new kind 

 of natural history. The understanding must also have fit subjects to 

 work upon, as well as real helps to work with. But our history, no 

 less than our logic, differs from the common in many resects ; parti 

 cularly, i. In its end, or office ; 2. Its collection ; 3. Its subtilty; 4. 

 Its choice ; and 5. Its appointment for what is to follow. 



Our natural history is not designed so much to please by its variety, 

 or benefit by gainful cxj&amp;gt;erimcnts, as to afford light to the discovery of 

 causes, and hold out the breasts to philosophy ; for though we princi 

 pally regard works and the active parts of the sciences, yet we wait for 



