MENTAL. CONSTITUTION OF ANIMAIS. 167 



simidst which they are destined to live. From the mandi- 

 nles of insects to the hand of man, all is seen to be in the 

 most harmonious relation to the things of the outward 

 world, thus clearly proving that design presided in the 

 creation of the whole — design again implying a designer, 

 another word for a Creator. 



It would be tiresome to present in this place even a 

 selection of the proofs which have been adduced on this 

 point. The Natural Theology of Paley, and the Bridge- 

 water Treatises, place the subject in so clear a light, that 

 the general postulate may be taken for granted. The phys- 

 ical constitution of animals is, then, to be regarded as in 

 the nicest congruity and adaptation to the external world. 



Less clear ideas have hitherto been entertained on the 

 mental constitution of animals. The very nature of this 

 constitution is not as yet generally known or held as as- 

 certained. There is, indeed, a notion of old standing, 

 that the mind is in some way connected with the brain; 

 but the metaphysicians insist that it is, in reality, known 

 only by its acts or effects, and they accordingly present 

 the subject in a form which is unlike any other kind of 

 science, for it does not so much as pretend to have nature 

 for its basis. There is a general disinclination to regard 

 mind in connection with organization, from a fear that 

 this must needs interfere with the cherished religious 

 doctrine of the spirit of man, and lower him to the level 

 of the brutes. A distinction is therefore drawn between 

 our mental manifestations and those of the lower animals, 

 the latter being comprehended under the term instinct, 

 while ours are collectively described as mind, mind be- 

 ing again a received synonyme with soul, the immortal 

 part of man. There is here a strange system of confusion 

 and error, which it is most imprudent to regard as essen- 

 tial to religion, since candid investigations of nature tend 

 to show its untenableness. There is, in reality, nothing 

 to prevent our regarding man as specially endowed with 

 an immo tal spirit, at the same time that his ordinary 

 mental r anifestations are looked upon as simple phe- 

 nomena esulting from organization, those of the lower 

 animals jeing phenomena absolutely the same in char- 

 acter, though developed within much narrower limits.* 



* •* Is D' t God the first cause of matter as well as of mind ? Dt> 

 not the first attributes of matter lie as inscrutable in the bosom of 

 God— of its first author— as those of mind ? Has not even matter 



