182 MENTAL CONSTITUTION OF ANIMALS. 



mate range of action, however liable to be abused. The 

 constitution of the mind generally points to a state of inti- 

 mate relation of individuals towards society, towards the 

 external world, and towards things above this world. No 

 individual being is integral or independent , he is only 

 part of an extensive piece of social mechanism. The in- 

 ferior mind, full of rude energy and unregulated impulse, 

 does not more require a superior nature to act as its mas- 

 ter and its mentor, than does the superior nature require 

 to be surrounded by such rough elements on which to ex- 

 ercise its high endowments as a ruling and tutelary power. 

 This relation of each to each produces a vast portion of 

 the active business of life. It is easy to see that, if we 

 were all alike in our moral tendencies, and all placed on 

 a medium of perfect moderation in this respect, the world 

 would be a scene of everlasting dulness and apathy. It 

 requires the variety of individual constitution to give mor- 

 al life to the scene. 



The indefiniteness of the potentiality of the human fac- 

 ulties, and the complexity which thus attends their re- 

 lations lead unavoidably to occasional error. If we con- 

 sider for a moment that there are not less than thirty such 

 faculties, that they are each given in different proportions 

 to different persons, that each is at the same time endow- 

 ed with a wide discretion as to the force and frequency of 

 its action, and that our neighbors, the world, and our 

 connexions with something beyond it, are all exercising 

 an ever-varying influence over us, we cannot be sur- 

 prised at the irregularities attending human conduct. 

 It is simply the penalty paid for the superior endow- 

 ment. It is here that the imperfection of our nature 

 resides. Causality and conscientiousness are, it is true, 

 guides over all; but even these are only faculties of the 

 same indeterminate constitution as the rest, and partake 

 accordingly of the same inequality of action. Man i& 

 therefore a piece of mechanism, which never can act so 

 as to satisfy his own ideas of what he might be — for he 

 can imagine a state of moral perfection, (as he can imagine 

 a globe formed of diamonds, pearls, tnd rubies,) though 

 his constitution forbids him to realize it. There ever will, 

 in the best disposed and most disciplined minds, be occa- 

 sional discrepancies between the amount of temptation 

 and the power summoned for regulation or resistance, or 

 between the stimulus and the mobility ti the faculty ; 



