U4 



SCIENCE. 



even the vapois of elementary bodies, including- the 'ele- 

 mentary gases, when more stric ly examined, will be 

 found capable of producing sounds. 



THE UNITY OF NATURE. 

 By the Duke of Argyll. 

 VI. 



{Continued from page 103.) 

 ON THE MORAL CHARACTER OF MAN, CONSIDERED IN 

 THE LIGHT OF THE UNITY OF NATURE. 



In dealing with this ques'ion, it is a comfort to remem- 

 ber that we are in possession of analogies deeply seated 

 in the constitution and in the course of Nature. It is 

 quite possible to ass gn to Intuition or to Instinct the 

 place and ra^k wh-ch really belongs to it, and to assign 

 also to what is called Experience the functions which are 

 unquestionably its own. There is no sense or faculty of 

 the mind which does not gain by education — not one 

 wlvch is independent of those processes of development 

 which result from its contact with the external world. 

 Bat neither is there any sense or faculty of the mind 

 which starts unfurnished with someone cr more of those 

 intuitive perceptions with which all education and all 

 development must begin. Just as evety exercise of rea- 

 son must be founded on certain axioms which are self- 

 evident to the logical facultv, so ail other exercises of the 

 mind must start from the direct perceotion of some rudi- 

 mentary truths. It would be strange indeed if the moral 

 faculty were any exception to .this fundamental law. 

 This facultv in its higher conditions, such as we see it in 

 the best men in the most highly civilized communities, 

 may stand at an incalulahle distance from its earliest and 

 simplest condi'ion, and still more from its lowest condi- 

 tion, such as we see it in the most degraded races of 

 mankind. But this distance has been reached from some 

 starting-point, and at that s'arting-point there must have 

 been some simple acts or dispos ; tions to which the sense 

 of obligation was ins inctively attached. And bevond all 

 question this is the fact. All men do instinctively know 

 what gives pleasure to themselves, and therefore also 

 what gives pleasure to other men. Moreover, to a very 

 large extent, the things which give them pleasure are the 

 real needs of li'e, and the acquisition or enjoyment of 

 these is not only useful but essential to the well-being 

 or even to the very existent of the race. And as Man 

 is a social animal by na'ure, with social instincts at least 

 as innate as those of the Ant or the Beaver or the Bee, 

 we may be sure that there were and are born with him 

 all those intuitive perceptions and desires which are nec- 

 essary to the growth and unfolding of his powers. And 

 this we know to be the fact, not only as a dcctrine 

 founded on the unities of Nature, but as a matter of uni- 

 versal observation and experience. We know that with- 

 out the Moral Sense Man could not fulfill the part which 

 belongs to him in the world. It is as necessary in the 

 earliest stages of the Family and of the Tribe, as it is in 

 the latest developments of the State and of the Church. 

 It is an element without which nothing can be done — 

 without which no man could trust another, and, indeed, 

 no man could trust himself. There is no bond of union 

 among men — even the lowest and the worst — which does 

 not involve and depend upon the sense of obligation. 

 There is no kind of brotherhood or association for any 

 purpose which could stand without it. As a matter of 

 fact, therefore, and not at all as a matter of speculation, 

 we know that the Moral Sense holds a high place as one 

 of the necessary conditions in the development of Man's 

 nature, in the improvement of his condition, and in the 

 attainment of that place wh ch may yet lie before h ; m in 

 the future of the world. There are other sentiments 

 and desires, which, being as needful, are equally instinct- 

 ive. Thus, the desire of communicating pleasure to 



o'hers is one of the instinc f s which is as universal in 

 Man as the desire of communicating knowledge. Both 

 are indeed branches of the same stem — off-shoots from 

 the same root. The acquisition of knowledge, to which 

 we are stimulated by the instinctive affections of curi- 

 osity and of wonder, is one of the greatest of human 

 pleasures, and the desire we have to communicate our 

 knowledge to others is the great motive-force on which 

 its progress and accumulation depend. The pleasure 

 which all men take, when their dispositions are good, 

 in sharing with others their own enjoyments, is another 

 feature quite as marked and quite as innafe in the char- 

 acter of Man. And if there is any course of action to 

 which we do instinctively attach the sentiment of moral 

 approbation, it is that course of action which assumes 

 that our own desires, and our own estimates of good, 

 and the standard by which we ought to judge of what is 

 due to and is desired by others. The social instincts of 

 our nature must, therefore, naturally and intuitively in- 

 j dicate benevolence as a virtuous, and malevolence as 

 a vicious disposition ; and, again, our knowledge of 

 j what is benevolent and what is malevolent is involved 

 j in our own instinctive sense of what to us is good, and 

 of what to us is evil. It is quite true that th : s sense 

 may be comparatively low or high, and consequently that 

 j the standard of obligation which is founded upon it may 

 I be elementary and nothing more. Those whose own 

 desires are few and rude, and whose own estimates of 

 good are very limited, must of course form an estimate 

 correspondingly poor and scant of what is good for, and 

 of what is desired by, others. But this exactly cor- 

 responds with the facts of human nature. This is pre- 

 cisely the variety of unity which its phenomena present. 

 There are no men of sane mind in whom the Moral 

 Sense does not exist ; that is to say, there are no men 

 who do not attach to some actions or other the senti- 

 ment of approval, and to some other actions the oppo- 

 site sentiment of condemnation. On the other hand, the 

 selection of the particular actions to which these differ- 

 ent sentiments are severally attached is a selection im- 

 mensely various ; there being, however, this one common 

 element in all — that the course of action to which men 

 do by instinct attach the feeling of moral obligation, is 

 that course of action which is animated by the feeling 

 that their own desires and their own estimate of good is 

 the standard by which they must judge of what is due 

 by them to others, and by others to themselves. 



And here we stand at the common point of departure 

 from which diverge the two great antagonistic schools 

 of ethical philosophy. On the other hand in the intuitive 

 and elementary character which we have assigned to the 

 sentiment of obligation, considered in itself, we have the 

 fundamental position of that school which asserts an in- 

 dependent basis of morality ; whilst, on the other hand, 

 in the elementary tru'hs which we have assigned to the 

 Moral Sense as its self-evident apprehensions, we have a 

 rule which corresponds, in one aspect at least, to the fun- 

 damental conception of the Utilitarian school. For the 

 rule which connects the idea of obligation with conduct 

 tending to the good of others, as tested by our own esti- 

 mate of what is good for ourselves, is a rule which clearly 

 brings the basis of morality into very close connection 

 with the practical results of conduct. Accordingly, one 

 of the ablest modern advocates of the Utilitarian system 

 has declared that " in the golden rule of Jesus of Naza- 

 reth we read the complete spirit of the ethics of Utility. 

 To do as you would be done by, and to love your 

 neighbor as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of 

 Utilitarian morals." 2 



This may well se D m a strange and almost a paradoxi- 

 cal result to those who have been accustomed to consider 

 the Utilitarian theory not so much a low standard of 

 morals, as an idea which is devoid altogether of that ele- 



3 J. S. Mill ; " Utilitarianism," pp. 24, 25. 



