CENTRAL 



SCIENCE. 



US 



ment in which the very essence of morality consists. 

 But it is a result due to these two causes — first, that under 

 the fire of controversy Utilitarians have been obliged to 

 import into the meaning of their words much that does 

 not really belong to them ; and secondly, to the fact, that 

 when this essential alteration has been made, then the 

 theory, or rather the portion of it which remains, does 

 represent one very important aspect of a very complex 

 truth. 



It will be well to examine a little more closely the dif- 

 ferent wavs in which these two causes operate. 



In the first place, as regards the ambiguities of lan- 

 guage, a moment's consideration will convince us that 

 the word " utility " has, in its proper and primary signi- 

 fication, nothing whatever of the ethical meaning which 

 is attached to it in the Utilitarian theory of morals. In its 

 elementary signification the useful is simply the service- 

 able. It is curious to observe that this last word has no 

 ethical savor about it. On the contrary, it is associated 

 rather with the lower uses than with the higher of con- 

 duct. If this be objected to as preventing the two words 

 from being really the equivalent of each other, then at 

 least let it be recognized that utility must be divested of 

 its ethical associations before it can be set up as an ethi- 

 cal test. If utility is first assumed to be the equivalent 

 of goodness, it becomes of course a mere play on words 

 to represent usefulness as the criterion of virtue. If we 

 are to conduct our analysis correctly, we must expel from 

 utility every adventitious element of meaning. The use- 

 fulness of a thing means nothing more than its condu- 

 civeness to some purpose. But it may be any purpose, — 

 morally good, or morally bad, or morally indifferent. 

 The boot-jack, the thumb-screw, and the rack are all 

 useful machines for the purpose of producing torture on 

 the victim, and for the purpose, too, of giving to the tor- 

 turers that pleasure or satisfaction which wicked men 

 find in tyranny or revenge. The words "good" and 

 " bad " are themselves often used in a secondary 

 and derivative sense, which, like " useful," may be destitute 

 of any ethical meaning. A good thumb screw would mean 

 an implement well adapted to produce the most exquisite 

 pain. A good torture may mean a torture well calculated 

 to gratify the savage sentiment of revenge. In like man- 

 ner, although not to the same extent, the words " right " 

 and "wrong" are often used with no ethical element of 

 meaning. The right way for a man who wishes to com- 

 mit suicide would be the way to a precipice over which 

 he desires to throw himself. But the same way is the 

 wrong way for him, if he wishes to avoid the danger of 

 falling. In this wav we may speak of the right way of 

 doing the most wicked things. One most eminent ex- 

 pounder of the Utilitarian theory has taken advantage of 

 this common use of the words " good " and " bad," and 

 of "right "and wrong," to represent utility and inutility 

 to be the essential idea of all goodness and of all badness 

 respectively. 3 Thus the unavoidable ambiguities "of 

 speech are employed to give a scientific aspect to the con- 

 founding and obliteration of the profoundest distinctions 

 which exist in knowledge. By the double process of ex- 

 pelling from goodness the idea of virtue, and of inserting 

 into u ility the idea of beneficence, the fallacies of lan- 

 guage become complete. Because subserviency to pur- 

 pose of any kind is the meaning of "good," when applied 

 equally to an instrument of torture and to an instrument 

 for the relief of suffering, therefore, it is argued, the same 

 meaning must be the essential one when we speak of a 

 good man. And so indeed it may be, if we know or as- 

 sume beforehand what the highest purpose is to which 

 Man can be made subservient. There is a well-known 

 Catechism of one of the Reformed churches which opens 

 with the qnestion, " What is the chief end of Man ?" 

 The answer is perhaps one of the noblest in the whole 

 compass of theology. " Man's chief end is to glorify God 



s Herbert Spencer : "Data of Ethics," chap. iii. 



and to enjoy Him forever." 4 Given certain further beliefs 

 as to the character of the Divine Being, and the methods 

 of his Government, then indeed it would be true that this 

 is a conception of the purpose of Man's existence which 

 would erect mere serviceableness or utility into a perfect 

 rule of conduct. Perhaps even a lower or less perfect 

 conception of the great aim of Man's life would be almost 

 enough. If virtue and beneficence are first assumed to 

 be the highest purpose of h ; s being, then subserviency to 

 that purpose may be all that is meant bv goodness. But, 

 without this assumption as to the " chief end of Man," 

 there would be no ethical meaning whatever in the phrase 

 of " a good man." It might mean a good thief, or a good 

 torturer, or a good murderer. Utility, that is to sav, mere 

 subserviency to any purpose, is undoubtedly agood thing in 

 itself, and of this kind is the goodness of a machine which 

 is invented for a bad or evil purpose. But this utility in 

 the machine is, so far as the machine is concerned, desti- 

 tute of any moral character whatever, and, so far as those 

 who employ it are concerned, the utility is not virtuous, 

 but, on the contrary, it is vicious. It is clear, therefore, 

 that when the word " utility " is used as meaning moral 

 or even physical good, and still more when it is identified 

 with virtue, or when it is declared to be the standard of 

 that which is right or virtuous in conduct, the word is 

 used not in its own proper sense, but in a special or ad- 

 ventitious sense, in which it is confined to one special 

 kind of usefulness, namely, that which conduces to good 

 ends, and good aims, and good purposes. That is to say, 

 the sense in which utility is spoken of as the test or 

 standard of virtue is a sense which assumes that good- 

 ness and virtue are independently known, or, in other 

 words, that they are determined and recognized by some 

 other test and some other standard. 



It is, however, clear that when by this other test and 

 standard, whatever it may be, we have already felt or 

 apprehended that it is right and virtuous to do 

 good to others, then the usefulness of any action or 

 of any course of conduct, in the production of such 

 good, does become a real test and indication of that 

 which we ought to do. It is a test or indication of the 

 particular things which it is right to do, but not at all a 

 test of the moral obligation which lies upon us to do 

 them. This obligation must be assumed, and isassumed, 

 in every argument on the moral utility of things. It is 

 by confounding these two very distinct ideas that the 

 Utilitarian theory of the ultimate basis of moral 

 obligation has so long maintained a precarious 

 existence, borrowing from the misuse of words a 

 strength which is not its own. But the moment 

 this distinction is clearly apprehended, then, although we 

 set aside the bare idea of usefulness, apart from the good 

 or bad purpose towards which that usefulness conduces, 

 as affording any explanation whatever of the ultimate 

 nature and source of duty, we may well, nevertheless, be 

 ready to adopt all that the Utilitarian theory can show 

 us of that inseparable unity which is established in the 

 constitution of the world between the moral character 

 and the ultimate results of conduct. As far as these re- 

 sults can be traced beforehand, and in proportion as they 

 can be traced farther and farther in the light of expand- 

 ing knowledge, they do indicate the path of duty. They 

 do indicate the line of action which is obligatory on vol- 

 untary agents, to whom a very large amount of power is 

 given in directing the course of things. Beyond all doubt 

 there are a thousand acts and a thousand courses of con- 

 duct which are in accordance with the Moral Sense, be- 

 cause and only because of the known happiness of their 

 effects. This is the fact, or rather the class of facts, 

 which has in all ages recommended the Utilitarian 

 theory of morals to so many powerful minds. For, in- 

 deed, if we understand by utility not the iow or limited 

 idea of mere usefulness for any purpose — not even the 



* " The Shorter Catechism, presented by the Westminster Assembly of 

 Divines to both Houses of Parliament, and by them approved." 



