No. 25—1882.] 



nirvana. 



171 



to respect both the Bnihmana and the Kshatriya, were puzzled by 

 their controversies, and could not understand the conflicting 

 statements made by the orthodox A/rya, or by the secularist* 

 or by the Upanisliad reformer. They, therefore, fell victims to 

 scepticism. Their leaders stigmatized their vi< v ws and stated 

 their grounds. The logic of scepticism f was thus developed 

 and it would be elucidated by a contrast between the view ; s of 

 the Upanisliad reformer and those of the Jaina. The one merely 

 adjusted the importance of a sacrifice and connived at the 

 slaughter of animals : the other was fired by enthusiasm of life- 

 he strongly condemned the slaughter el' any animal for any 

 purpose. To the one V edie lore, though a dispensation old 

 and inferior, yet was important as the means of bis superior 

 wisdom - the other discarded all notion of revelation. The one 

 believed that an abstract essence — a generality, was real, eternal, 

 and could be cognized : the other declared that a generality was 

 only a kind of knowledge, and its notion was derived froirTrhe 

 knowledge of particular facts. The one aspired after absorption 

 into the eternal, all-pervading essence : the other aspired after 

 maintaining his individuality i through eternity. The one 

 believed that all phenomena are only transient and are ultimately 

 to be resolved into Brahma : the other believed that they are 

 real and eternally abide. The one thought that the universe is 

 either created by or emanated from the Supreme Person : the 

 other discarded all notion of a personal creator. The one was 

 definite in his statements and had resort to the utterances of the 

 Kish:,- and attempted to interpret them anew to support his views: 

 the other more or less hesitated, but declared that virtue eter- 

 nally abideth, and that it is revealable by eminent teachers. 



* Loukayatika or Charvaka as popularly known. 



f This is called Syad vada. It states: — Perhaps a thing is — perhaps it is 

 not. Perhaps in sequence of time it is and it is not. Perhaps at once it is 

 and it is not. — this cannot be stated. Perhaps it is and cannot he stated — 

 perhaps it is not, and cannot he stated. Perhaps in sequence of time it is. and 

 it is not, and cannot he at once stated. 



% This view that every individual object has a spirit is met with in the 

 Zendavesta in its chapter on Farohars, 



