336 



SCIENCE. 



[Vol. VII., No. 166 



Nobody with the slightest knowledge of the an- 

 nals of human thought ought to hesitate con- 

 cerning where such a doctrine historically belongs, 

 what line of philosophic tradition it represents, 

 and upon what general considerations it must in- 

 evitably found itself, in case it gets any sound 

 foundation at all. It is the well-known idealism 

 of Plato, the immanent teleology of Aristotle, the 

 doctrine that the continental schools of modern 

 philosophy have from the first labored to compre- 

 hend, and to establish upon a modern foundation, 

 the doctrine par excellence of post-Kantian ideal- 

 ism in Germany, and, in general, the contention 

 of objective idealism everywhere : this it is that 

 Dr. Abbot's book has somehow to present to us, 

 and that every serious philosophic student would 

 surely rejoice to find helpfully expounded and 

 defended, with any new shading or emphasis, and 

 with any new and significant method of proof. 

 To the consistent believer in this objective ideal- 

 ism, the novelty of Dr. Abbot's argument must 

 therefore lie — not in the main doctrine itself, 

 which we all know so well and have toiled over so 

 frequently, but in the form of the demonstration. 

 We all are aware that science does undertake to 

 know a real world, full of relations, and rationally 

 intelligible ; and all philosophical idealists of any 

 significance whatsoever have been interested, 

 ever since there were any sciences of experience, 

 in proving at least two theses : 1°, that these 

 sciences, in their assurance of the objective 

 reality and thorough-going, rational intelligibility 

 of the world, are absolutely and demonstrably 

 right ; and, 2°, that this right assurance, properly 

 interpreted, makes of this real world of science 

 nothing more nor less than the expression of an 

 absolute intelligence, i.e., of an infinite spirit. 

 This effort, we insist, all idealists of any signifi- 

 cance have made, in their way and measure, from 

 the first. Dr. Abbot will therefore be greeted by 

 idealists as a welcome ally, if he adds a significant 

 argument of his own. 



As to his positive achievements, however, in 

 this main undertaking, we feel no small disap- 

 pointment. The link between that objective in- 

 telligibility of things which science postulates, 

 and that objective conscious intelligence in things 

 which Dr. Abbot, like all other objective idealists, 

 wants to demonstrate, is a link that philosophy is 

 bound to find if it can, but that cannot possibly 

 be found, as Dr. Abbot at first undertakes to find 

 it, by any bare experience of the facts of nature. 

 The whole historical outcome of the philosophy 

 of experience has shown that, and Dr. Abbot 

 helps his case no whit by such scholasticism as he 

 later employs, at the top of p. 151, where, having 

 previously told us that scientific experience shows 



or postulates the universe, or the self-existent, 

 to be ' infinitely intelligible,' he goes on thus : — 



" That which is self -existent must be self- 

 determined in all its attributes ; and it could not 

 possibly determine itself to be intelligble unless it 

 were likewise intelligent. Self-existent intelligi- 

 bility is self -intelligibility, and self-intelligibility 

 is self -intelligence ; or that which intelligibly 

 exists through itself must be intelligible to itself, 

 and therefore intelligent in itself." 



All this, regarded as mere assertion, may be 

 true, and in fact the present reviewer does most 

 potently and powerfully believe it, although he 

 holds it not fitting that it should be thus set down ; 

 for, thus set down, this kind of objective idealism 

 is like sweet bells jangled, out of tune and harsh. 

 But regarded not as bare assertion, but as argu- 

 ment, the statements as quoted take the form of 

 an arrant scholasticism, and can convince nobody. 

 Our author, in fact, only feels the connection be- 

 tween the objective intelligibility that science 

 postulates, and the objective intelligence that 

 philosophy seeks to demonstrate. He states this 

 his feeling sometimes as a sort of vague inductive 

 argument, to the effect that one has never found 

 any thing but intelligence actually capable of 

 making intelligible systems of things ; and some- 

 times as a scholastic rambling from the word 

 ' intelligible ' to the word ' intelligent,' through 

 various intermediate terms. In either form, how- 

 ever, the argument is unphilosophical and an- 

 tiquated. The objective intelligibility of the 

 world does indeed enable us rationally to conclude 

 that the world contains objective intelligence ; 

 but we cannot so conclude through a mere induc- 

 tion, which would at once, like the old forms 

 of the design argument, fall a prey to perfectly 

 obvious sceptical objections ; nor yet may we 

 argue by means of a multitude of scholastic 

 terms, and hope in that way to accomplish our 

 purpose. We must take a little more trouble in 

 philosophy than this. We must tread in certain 

 1 tat lis of critical argument that Dr. Abbot, with 

 all " his idealistic enthusiasm, has studiously and 

 very unphilosophically avoided, although many 

 of them are very old facts in the history of ideal- 

 ism. 



Space has forced us to be, we may fear, even 

 discourteously brief in these remarks upon Dr. 

 Abbot's positive doctrine ; but, as to his historical 

 and critical introduction to this doctrine, we de- 

 spair of doing more than to suggest either its 

 scope, or the thoughts that arise in us as we read 

 it. Dr. Abbot is, on the whole, so thoughtful, so 

 enthusiastic, so readable in spite of his termi- 

 nology, so devout, so high-minded, so terribly in 

 earnest, that it seems wicked impiety to say what 



