—  829  — 
But  how  can  it  be  proved  that  the  (various)  terms  which  are  used  to  94.  a.  l 
designate  a  Soul  refer  to  a  flux  of  elements  only  and  that  there  is  no  other  (8  b-~ 
(reality)  denoted  by  them? 
This  is  deduced  from  the  fact  that  there  neither  is  a  direct  perception 
nor  an  inference  (in  favour  of  the  existence  of  the  Soul).  Elements  really 
existing,  when  present,  are  subject  to  direct  perception,  as  f.  i.  the  six  kinds 
of  objects:  (colours,  sounds,  smells  etc.)  and  intellect  (itself,  in  the  preceding 
moment) 4.  Otherwise  their  existence  may  be  infered  as  f.  i.  the  five  sense- 
(sight  etc.).  The  (existence)  of  the  latter  is  infered  as  follows: 
General  proposition.  (Experience)  shows,  that  although  the  (general) 
causes  be  present,  the  effect  is  not  produced  m  absence  of  its  special  cause, 
but  it  is  produced,  when  the  latter  is  (also)  present. 
Example,  As  f.  i.  a  plant  (is  produced  from  its  special  cause— the  seed). 
,    Application.  Experience  shows  that  although  the  object  be  present  and 
attention  aroused,  (it  nevertheless  sometimes  happens)  that  perception  is  not 
produced,  while  (in  other  cases)  it  is  produced. 
Example.  \Yith  the  blind,  the  deaf  etc.  (it  is  not  — )  and  with  those  not 
blind,  not  deaf  etc.  (it  is  produced). 
Conclusion.  Therefore  it  is  established  beyond  any  doubt  that  here  also 
a  special  cause  is  either  absent  or  present.  This  special  cause  it  the  sense - 
faculty  (of  sight  etc.)5.  This  is  (a  valid)  inference.  But  whith  regard  to  the 
Soul  no  such  (inference  is  possible).  Consequently  there  is  no  Soul. 
But  then  the  «Individual»6  the  existence  of  which  is  admitted  by  the 
school  of  the  Vatsiputriyas7  what  does  is  represent? 
First  of  all  we  must  examine  the  question,  whether  they  admit  (the 
existence  of  the  Individual)  as  a  reality  or  as  an  existence  merely  nominal  ? 
Vatsipatnya.  What  is  an  actual,  and  what  a  nominal  existence? 
Vasubandhu.  If  something  exists  by  itself  (as  a  separate  element),  it 
has  an  actual  existence,  as  f.  i.  colour  and  other  (ultimate  elements  of  matter 
and  mind)8.  But  if  something  represents  a  combination  (of  such  elements)  it  is 
a  nominal  existence,  as  f.  i.  milk. 
Vatsiputrlya.  (So  far  I  do  not  object).  But  what  do  you  follow 
from  this? 
•  Vasubandhu.  It  follows  first  of  all,  that  if  Soul  is  an  actual  existence, 
it  must  have  an  essence  of  its  own  and  must  be  something  different  from  the 
elements  of  a  personal  life,  (just  as  these  elements  differ  from  one  another). 
Secondly  you  must  indicate  its  cause,  for  otherwise  it  would  be  an  existence 
uncaused,  (an  eternal  being),  and  you  would  thus  become  guilty  of  professing 
Нзвѣстія  P.A.H.  Ш9. 
