•—834  — 
that  he  himself  is  this  colour  and  this  shape,  nor  can  we  deny  it.  The  same 
applies  (to  all  the  other  material  elements,  voice  etc.)  and  also  to  the 
mental  phenomena14.  If  we  have  a  perception  of  some  mental  phenomena 
.through  the  intellect,  and  if  thereby  the  idea  of  an  intelligent  being  presents 
itself  to  our  mind,  we  may  maintain  that  this  Individual  is  cognized  by  a 
perception  purely  mental;  but  we  neither  can  admit  that  he  himself  repre- 
sents those  mental  phenomena,  nor  can  we  (absolutely)  deny  it. 
96.  a.  2  Vasiibandliu.  But  if  that  be  true,  the  same  argument  may  be  applied 
i2a— i)  to  ^e  COgnition  of  milk  and  other  (composite  substances.  They  include 
elements  of  colour,  of  smell,  taste  and  touch).  If  we  have  a  direct  visual 
-perception  of  a  definite  colour  (and  flat  surface),  and  through  it  the  idea  of 
milk  or  of  water  presents  itself  to  our  mind,  we  may  maintain  that  this 
milk  and  this  water  is  cognized  by  sight.  But  we  neither  can  admit  that 
they  themselves  are  this  colour  and  shape,  nor  can  we  absolutely  deny  it. 
The  same  might  be  said  about  their  elements  cognized  by  smell,  taste  and 
touch.  We  may  have  a  direct  perception  of  these  substances  through  the 
sense  of  touch,  but  we  neither  can  admit  that  they  are  themselves  this  touch 
nor  can  we  absolutely  deny  it.  Because  (if  these  colour,  smell,  taste  and 
touch  werp  each  of  them  milk  itself  or  water  itself),  we  should  have  four 
different  kinds  of  milk  or  water.  We  arrive  at  the  following  conclusion:  just 
as  milk  and  water  are  conventional  names  (for  a  set  of  independent  elements), 
for  some  colour,  (smell,  taste  and  touch)  taken  together,  so  is  the  designation 
«Individual»  but  a  common  name  for  the  different  elements,  which  it  is  com- 
9G. a. 6  posed  of.  But  (let  us  consider  the  argument  more  closely).  You  have  said: 
((if  we  have  a  visual  perception  of  some  colour  and  shape,  and  if  we  thereby 
indirectly  cognize  the  presence  of  a  human  Individual))  etc.  Now,  what  is 
the  meaning  of  these  words?  Does  it  mean  that  the  cognition  of  the  Indivi- 
dual is  caused  by  its  visible  element,  or  does  it  mean  that  both  are  cognized 
simultaneously  ? 
(Vatsiputnya.  What  is  the  difference  between  these  two  possibilities?) 
Vasubandhu.  If  the  visible  element  is  the  cause  producing  the  cogni- 
tion of  the  Individual,  and  at  the  same  time  we  are  told,  that  the  latter  does 
not  differ  from  the  former,  (this  must  be  true  of  all  the  other  causes  too), 
and  since  they  are  not  different  from  the  Individual,  there  neither  can  be  any 
difference  between  themselves.  Hence  we  arrive  at  the  absurd  conclusion,  that) 
the  visible  element  in  its  turn  does  not  differ  from  sight,  light  and  attention, 
since  these  all  are  the  causes  of  a  visual  perception.  Now,  (take  the  other 
possibility) :  the  cognition  of  the  Individual  appears  at  the  same  time  with 
