—  835  — 
the  cognition  of  the  visible  element.  The  question  arises:  do  we  perceive  the 
Individual  by  that  very  perception,  by  which  we  perceive  the  visible  form,  or 
by  another  one?  In  the  first  case  the  Individual  would  be  essentially  the  ' 
same  as  the  visible  form,  in  other  words,  it  would  be  the  name  for  some 
visible  element  only.  But  then  how  could  we  make  a  distinction  between 
them?  How  could  we  tell:  «this  is  the  bodlily  frame»  and  «this  is  the 
Individual  itself».  Or  how  indeed  could  we  surmise  that  the  Indivi-  ' 
dual  is  something  as  really  existing,  as  the  visible  element  is,  if  there 
altogether  be  no  distinction  between  them?  We  can  assume  etc.  existence 
only  on  the  basis  of  some  cognition.  What  is  here  said  about  the  visible 
element,  might  be  extended  to  all  the  other  elements,  mental  phenomena 
included.  But  supposing  the  Individual  to  be  cognized  by  a  separate  act  of  96.  ь.  з. 
perceptive  knowledge,  then  it  should  be  something  quite  different  from  the 
visible  element,  as  both  are  cognized  at  different  moments,  just  as  blue 
differs  from  yellow,  or  just  as  two  moments  (in  the  existence  of  the  same 
object)  differ  from  one  another.  This  might  also  be  extended  to  all  other 
elements,  mental  phenomena  included. 
Vatsipidnya.  But  (there  is  still  another  possibility):  just  as  we  main- 
tain that  the  Individual  and  the  visible  element  are  neither  different,  nor  are 
they  identical,  we  shall  extend  (the  same  principle)  to  their  cognitions;  they 
are  neither  different,  nor  are  thev  identical! 
Vasubandhu.  Well  (if  you  go  on  this  way  with  the  relation  of  neither 
different  nor  identical),  you  neither  will  be  capable  even  to  maintain  that 
(this  cognition  of  an  Individual)  is  a  passing  phenomenon  and  this  will  mean 
giving  up  your  own  tenet,  (namely  that  cognitions  are  always  phenomenal). 
Further  (if  you  are  in  the  right  and  this  Individual)  really  exists,  %.ъ.  е. 
but  is  neither  identical  nor  different  from  the  visible  element,  why  then 
has  the  Lord  (expressly  denied  it),  declaring  that  «neither  the  visible 
element  js  the  Self  nor  any  other  element,  consciousness  included))?  And 
if  the  Individual  is  perceived  through  sight,  what  is  the  objective  cause 
producing  such  perception?  Is  it  the  visible  frame,  or  is  it  the  Individual, 
or  both  together?  If  it  is-  the  visible  okment  it  cannot  possibly  be  a 
perception  of  the  Individual,  no  more  than  it  can  be  a  perception  of  his 
voice  or  the  like.  Because  the  objective  cause  of  every  perception  belongs 
necessarily  to  its  own  special  field,  (a  visual  perception  can  be  of  colour  or 
form  only).  And  if  (you  suppose  it  to  be  the  Individual  itself  or  the  Indivi- 
dual and  the  body  together,  you  will  be  contradicted15  by  Scripture,  because 
Scripture  lays  a  stress  upon  the  point  that  there  are  only  two  causes  pro  du- 
