836 
07. a.  l.  cive  of  perception.  Thus  it  is  declared:  «0,  Brother!  when  a  visual  percep- 
tion is  produced,  the  first  cause  of  it  is  the  faculty  of  sight,  the  second  a 
visible  object.  Why  is  that?  Because  the  production  of  all  visual  perceptions, 
whatever  they  may  be,  is  conditioned  by  the  existence  of  the  faculty  of 
sight  and  of  a  visible  object. »  In  that  case  it  would  likewise  follow,  that  the 
Individual,  (did  it  exist),  would  be  something  changing  in  every  moment,  for 
Scripture  declares,  that  «whatever  be  the  active  cause  or  the  object  of  a 
visual  perception,  is  eo  ipso  a  momentary  existence)).  Now  if  your  Individual 
is  not  a  visible  object,  it  never  will  be  cognized  by  sight.  As  to  your  theory 
that  the  Individual  may  be  cognized  by  all  the  six  kinds  of  perception,  (we 
must  observe,  that)  if  it  can  be  cognized  by  audition,  it  must  be  something 
quite  different  from  the  visible  element,  as  different  as  sound  is  from  colour. 
On  the  other  hand  if  it  is  cognized  by  sight  it  must  be  something  quite 
different  from  the  voice,  as  different  as  colour  is  from  sound.  The  same  argu- 
ment may  be  extended  to  the  other  sources  of  cognition.  Moreover  your 
theory  is  in  contradiction  with  the  following  Scriptural  passage:  «0,  Brahmin! 
each  of  these  five  sense  faculties  has  its  own  separate  field  of  action  and  its 
own  objects  because  each  one  experiences  its  own  objects  in  its  ow^  special 
field16.  One  faculty  cannot  act  in  the  domain  of  another,  or  experience  objects 
belonging  to  it.  Thus  we  have  the  faculties  of  sight,  of  audition,  of  smell, 
of  taste,  of  touch  and  of  the  intellect.  The  first  five  have  their  proper  domain 
and  their  own  objects  each,  the  faculty  of  the  intellect  being  the  common 
resort  for  all».  The  consequence  of  this  would  be  that  there  is  altogether  no 
such  object  as  an  Individual,  and  if  it  does  not  constitute  an  object  of  cogni- 
tion, it  will  follow  that  it  cannot  be  cognized  at  all. 
97.  ъ.  I.  Vatsiputnya,  If  this  would  be  the  case,  then  the  Individual  could  not 
be  cognized  even  by  the  intellect.  (But  in  its  turn  this  is  contradicted  by 
Scripture).  It  is  declared  in  the  Parable  of  the  Six  Animals:  «tlie  six 
faculties  have  each  of  them  a  separate  field  of  action,  each  has  a  natural 
propensity  towards  a  special  domain  of  its  own  and  its  own  special  objects. » 
(This  propensity  belongs  to  intellect  alone,  hence  we  understand  this  passage 
to  indicate  that  the  faculty  of  the  intellect  may  cognize  every  objects). 
Vasubandhu.  This  passage  does  not  mention  the  cognitive  faculties 
in  the  current  sense  of  the  six  cognitive  faculties,  (because  it  mentions  their 
propensity  i.  e.  a  conscious  choice).  Now  the  five  senses  and  the  (indefinite) 
consciousness  produced  by  them  cannot  have  any  propensity  towards  visual  or 
other  perception.  But  by  their  influence  mind  is  attracted  and  they  are  followed 
by  definite  mental  cognitions  which  are  refered  to  in  the  above  passage 
