—  852  — 
юз.  ь.  5  Vatsiputnya.  On  the  contrary !  passionate  love  towards  the  (real)  Self 
{6b— 5).  .g  neyer  experienced. 
Vasiibandhu.  According  to  this  opinion  there  can  be  no  love  for  the 
(pure)  Self,  this  love  appears  only  when  something  which  is  not  at  all  the 
real  Self,  is  mistaken  for  the  Self.  This  you  suppose  to  be  logical !  (But  it  is 
impossible  logically  to  prove  such  tenets.  Therefore  you  are  grossly  mistaken, 
when  you  suppose  that  the  desease  of  such  wrong  views  reducing  Salvation 
to  nought  might  appear  in  a  natural  way  within  the  pale  of  the  Holy  Doc- 
trine of  Buddha).  To  summarise:  One  category  (of  thinkers,  as  f.  i.  the 
Vatsiputrlyas)  admit  the  existence  of  on  (undefinable)  Individuality  (along 
with  the  elements).  An  other  category  (as  f.  i.  the  Mädhyamikas)  declare 
that  there  is  altogether  nothing  real,  (i.  e.  the  elements  themselves  have  no 
real  existence).  These  two  wrong  doctrines  have  appeared  wjthin  the  pale 
of  Buddhism.  There  are  besides  the  heterodox  teachers,  who  maintain  that 
the  Soul  is  a  quite  independent  substance.  All  these  wrong  doctrines  make 
Salvation  impossible  and  this  is  their  irremissible  fault! 
[§  13.  Memory  explained], 
юз  b.  7.         Vatsiputnya.  Now,  if  there  absolutely  is  no  Soul,  how  is  it  then,  that 
the  detached  moments  of  consciousness  can  remember  or  recognise  things 
wrhich  have  been  experienced  a  long  time  ago? 
Vasubandhu.  Consciousness,  being  in  a  special  condition  and  connected 
with  a  (previous)  knowledge  of  the  remembered  object,  produces  its 
recollection. 
Vatsiputnya.  What  is  this  special  condition  of  consciousness  which  is 
immediately  followed  by  remembrance? 
Vasubandlm.  It  is  a  condition  which  includes  1)  attention  directed 
towards  this  object,  2)  an  idea  etc.  similar  or  otherwise  connected  with  it  and 
3)  absence  of  bodily  pain,  grief  or  distraction  etc.,  impairing  its  capacity. 
But  supposing  all  these  conditions  are  realised,  consciousness  nevertheless  is 
not  able  to  produce  remembrance,  if  it  is  not  connected  with  a  previous  ex- 
perience of  the  remembered  object.  If  on  the  other  hand  it  is  so  connected, 
but  the  above  conditions  are  absent,  it  likewise  is  not  able  to  produce  it 
Both  factors  are  necessary  —  (a  previous  cognition'and  a  suitable  state  of 
mind).  Then  only  memory  appears.  Experience  shows  that  no  other  forces 
are  capable  (of  evoking  it). 
Vatsiputnya,  But  (if  there  were  absolutely  nothing  permanent,  it  would 
mean  that)  one  consciousness  has  perceived  the  object  and  an  other  one 
