—  939  — 
■  there  is  no  difference  between  existence  and  the  element  which  does  exist 
!  The  same  applies  to  consciousness,  (there  is  nothing  that  does  cognise, 
I    apart  from  the  evanescent  flashings  of  consciousness  itself). 
[§  15.  Samkhya  views  discussed]. 
Samkhya.  If  consciousness  is  not  a  product  of  a  Soul,  (if  it  has  no  other  іоб.ъ.  i. 
cause  than  consciousness  itself),  the  following  moment  springing  up  from  the 
preceding  one,  then  how  is  it  to  be  explained  1)  that  it  does  not  remain 
perpetually  just  the  same,  and  2)  (if  there  be  a  change),  why  not  in  a  fixed 
order  of  succession,  like  a  sprout,  a  stem,  leaves  etc.  (produced  from  a  seed)? 
Vasubandhu.  (As  regards  the  first  point,  we  answer  that)  all  elements 
which  partake  in  the  process  of  life  are  characterised  by  a  constant  change, 
(they  have  no  duration).  They  constitute  a  stream  in  which  the  next  moment 
is  necessarily  different  from  the  preceding  one.  Such  is  the  inmost  nature  of 
every  thing  living! 
(Sämkhya.  There  are  exceptions!  f.  i.  in  cataleptic  states  neither  body 
nor  mind  undergo  any  change). 
Vasiibandhu.  If  there  really  were  exceptions  (to  the  principle  of  Uni- 
versal Change),  and  if  the  ascetics  after  being  merged  in  transic  medidation 
and  having  reached  the  climax  of  it  would  really  appear  in  a  state  of  perfect 
identity  of  body  and  mind,  (without  absolutely  any  change  in  them),  then  there 
could  be  no  difference  between  the  last  and  the  first  moment  of  such  a  state  of 
medidation,  and  there  could  be  no  spontaneous  awakening  from  the  trance  in 
the  last  moment.  (Therefore  there  is  an  imperceptible  constant  change  going 
on  even  in  such  states  as  catalepsy). 
(As  regards  the  second  point  we  maintain  that  in  the  continuous  stream  Ю5.  b.  5. 
of  ideas)  there  positively  is  a  fixed  order  of  succession :  if  one  idea  springs 
up  from  another  one,  it  does  so  with  necessity.  There  is  a  certain  affinity 
(between  ideas),  in  virtue  of  which  there  are  ideas  somehow  similar  to  others 
and  having  the  power  of  evoking  them.  As  f.  i  when  the  idea  of  a  woman  is 
immediately  associated  (in  the  mind  of  an  ascetic)  with  the  idea  of  an  impure 
body,  or  (in  the  mind  of  a  married  man)  with  the  idea  of  her  husband,  son 
etc.,  and  if  later  on,  in  the  changing  stream  of  thought,  the  same  idea  of  a 
woman  reappears,  it  has  the  power  of  evoking  these  ideas  of  an  impure  body 
or  of  a  husband,  son  etc.,  because  they  are  associated  with  it,  but  it  has  not 
the  power  of  evoking  other  (ideas,  not  so  associated).  Again  the  idea  of  a 
female  may  be  followed  by  various  ideas  arising  one  after  another,  (but  if 
НзБІетія  Р.Л.Н.  1919.  6} 
