—  952  — 
Л;  18),  it  represents  no  different  dharma,but  with  respect  to  it  the  manas  (i.  e.  dhätu  Л°  6),  repre- 
sents the  preceding  moment.  Others  take  intellect  here  to  mean  mental  phenomena,  such  as  hatred 
pleasure,  pain  etc.;  they  are  cognised  directly  by  selfperception.  contrary  to  cognitions  by  tradit 
ion  (ägama),  fancy  (vikalpa)  and  ecstasy  (yoga)  (Yacom.). 
5  Yacom.:  «How  is  it  proved  with  precision  that  the  cause  must  be  the  organ  of  sense? 
There  must  be  some  cause  —  only  this  is  proved,  but  not  that  the  cause  is  precisely  the  sense 
organ.»  The  question  is  solved  by  refering  to  the  intuition  (pranidhäna)  of  great  men  (mabarsi) 
and  to  universal  consent  about  the  existence  of  (invisible)  organs  of  sense. 
6  The  Yatsiputriyas  make  apparently  adistinctionbetween  the  terms  pudgala  and  ätman,  they 
are  pudgala. vädinah,  but  not  ätmavädinah.  But  Yasubandhu  holds  the  pudgala  to  be  a  concealed 
ätman  and  maintains  that  there  is  no  difference  between  pudgala,  ätman,  sattva,  jlva,  manuja, 
purusa  etc.,  as  far  as  all  these  notions  are  equally  incompatible  with  the  theory  of  separate  ele- 
ments and  their  interdependent  functions.  Cf.  Kathävatthu  p.  a.  p.  S:  puggalo,  attl,  satto,  jlvo. 
7  Yacom.:  Yatsiputrlyä  äryasammatiyäh  (sic!).  Both  these  schools  are  mentioned  aspudga- 
galavädins  in  the  Kathävatthu-ppakarana-atthakathä,  p.  8,  and  by  Yasumitra  and  Bhavya.  In  Hiuen- 
Thsang's  time  only  one  of  them  the  Sammitiyas  seem  to  have  had  practical  importance,  cmp. 
Rhys  Davids  J.R.A.S.  1891  p.  411  f.  Although  there  is  a  great  difference  in  the  method  о 
exposing  a  scientifical  disquisition,  between  the  Kathävatthu  and  Yasubandhu,  still  the  arguments 
pro  and  contra  are  very  often  the  same.  We  may  conclude  that  Yasubandhu's  exposition  repre- 
sents a  fairly  adequate  picture  of  the  battlefield  on  which  the  first  dissentions  raged  at  the 
time  of  the  primitive  schism.  According  to  Yacomitra  the  tenet  of  the  Yatsiputriyas  represents 
the  following  argument: 
Proposition:  an  Individual  is  something  really  existing,  but  it  is  neither  possible  to  main- 
tain that  it  is  different  from  its  elements,  nor  is  it  possible  to  maintain  that  it  is  quite  the  same. 
Beason:  for  an  Individual  is  a  name  applied  to  an  existence  conditioned  by  the  existence 
of  its  own  causes  —  the  elements. 
Example;  just  as  fire  is  a  name  applied  to  a  fact,  which  is  conditioned  by  the  existence  of 
its  own  cause  —  the  fuel. 
General  proposition:  an  existence  of  which  it  is  impossible  neither  to  say  that  it  is 
different,  nor  that  it  is  quite  the  same  as  an  other  one  which  is  its  cause,  and  which  receives 
a  special  name  as  a  product  of  its  own  causes  —  such  an  existence  is  a  reality. 
Conclusion:  Hence  the  Individual  is  a  reality. 
In  the  К  a  t  h  5  v  a  1 1  h  u  the  argument  of  the  Yatsiputriyas  and  Sammitiyas  in  favour  of 
the  existence  of  Soul  is  substantially  the  same,  but  the  form  in  which  it  is  exposed,  in  accor- 
dance with  the  old  system]of  dialectics,  is  quite  different.  It  begins  thus  (Kathävatthu  p.  1.  cmp. 
atthakatha,  p.  8): 
Sihavira.  Do  we  have  any  real  knowledge  of  a  Soul  as  a  reality?  (saccikattho=bhütatthö 
paramattho= anussavädivasena  agahetabbo). 
Vatsiputnya.  Yes! 
Sihavira.  Hence  it  is  cognised  m»the  (same)  maimer  (like  all  other)  realities  cognised  by 
wright  knowledge? 
Vatsiputnya.  No! 
In  giving  the  first  affirmative  answer  the  Yatsiputriya  has  in  mind  that  there  is,  in  his . 
opinion,  an  intermediate  category  of  being  which  is  neither  transient,  nor  eternal,  neither  caused 
nor  uncaused.  Soul  belongs  to  this  category,  hence  it  is  a  kind  of  reality.  In  denying  the  second 
question  he  means  that  Soul  is  not  included  neither  in  the  skandhas,  nor  in  the  ayatanas  and 
dkatus. 
8  It  is  clear  from  this  passage  that  dharmas  are  ultimate  or  absolute  realities,  taking  the 
term  «absolute»  in  the  second  meaning  as  settled  by  J.  S.  Mill.,  Examination  of  sir  W.  Hamil- 
ton's philosophy,  6  ed.  p.  50. 
(J  What  has  no  cause  has  no  practical  efficiency,  it  Ы  practically  non-existent.  The  Yai- 
bhhSsjkas  admit  of  3  kinds  of  uncaused  or  eternal  (asaraskrta)  existence,  but  for  Yasubandhu  they 
