—  957  — 
existing.  0  Phälguna!  I  dont  say  «he  does  take».  If  I  were  to  say  «he  takes  them»,  these  words 
would  afford  thee  pleasure,  is  it  not  so,  Phälguna?  Yes,  master!  Therefore  there  is  no  one  who 
assumes  the  elements,  or  throws  them  off». 
46  H.  Ths.;  (20 — 4a)  «Again  if  you  say  that  you  are  supposing  the  new  aggregates  which 
appear  to  be  something  «one»  (i.  e.  simple)  and  which  you  say  are  identical  with  the  Ego,  being 
in  number  not  more  than  one,  then  positively  you  must  suppose  that  the  Ego  is  different  from 
the  aggregates  and  permanent.  (But  you  the  Vatsiputriyas  are  also  saying  that  the  Ego  is  not 
different,  and  not  permanent). 
47  smra-ba  hdi  phyogs  la-la  yod-pa  yin-no  ==  ekadeciya  eso  vädah,  H.  Ths.  «this  is  the 
mistake  of  that  schoob.  What  school?  Of  the  treatises  of  those  who  suppose  that  the  produced 
rupas  coincide  with  the  primary  constituents». 
48  Kun-tu-rgyu  smra-byed-kyis  «by  the  speaking  ascetic»(?) 
49  Yac.  supposes  that  the  view  of  the  grammarians  is  here  alluded  to:  bhävasya  bhavitra- 
pek§atväd  iti  vaiyäkaranab.  But  Biuen  Thsang  thinks  that  this  controversy  about  an  agent  is 
directed  against  a  Slmkhya  philosopher.  The  aim  of  Yasubandhu  is  to  establish  that  there  are 
cognitions,  but  no  real  cogniser.  This  may  be  directed  against  the  Sämkhya  system  where  ätman 
is  the  cognising  principle,  but  it  does  not  agree  with  it  inasmuch  as  the  ätman  is  passive,  not  an 
agent.  We  retain  the  designation  cf  Vatsiputiiya  as  adversary,  because,  us  asual,  he  may  start 
questions  not  only  in  accordance  with  his  own  views  (svamatena),  but  also  from  the  standpoint  of 
an  other  system  (paramatam  ägritya). 
so  Särüpyam  «coordination»  is  here  meant  to  explain  the  connexion  between  consciousness 
and  its  object.  It  is  clear  that  there  is  no  «grasping»  or  «apprehending»  of  the  object  by  know- 
ledge according  to  Yasubandhu.  The  objective  element  is  appearing  simultaneously  with  the 
flashing  of  consciousness,  both  are  independent,  but  there  is  a  mutual  correspondence  between 
them.  This  reminds  us  partly  of  the  Slmkhya  view  according  to  which  knowledge  is  not  in- 
fluenced by  its  object,  but  merely  reflects  it.  We  meet  this  theory  of  sarupya  in  a  somewhat 
modified  condition  in  later  idealistic  buddhist  systems,  comp.  Nyäyabindu  and  tikä,I, 20,21  and  11,4 
in  my  edition.  Bibl.  Buddh.  VII. 
51  WTe  find,  this  definition  in  the  Bhäsya  of  Pracastapäda:  apräptayoh  präptih  samyogah. 
The  definition  of  the  Vaic.  Sutra  VII,  2,  9  is  different. 
52  Cf.  Pänini  I,  4.  54. 
53  Litt.  108.  a.  8:  a  continuity  is  citta  (H.  Th.  rupa  and  citta)  following  on  an  action  and 
being  produced  later  on;  its  change  is  its  appearing  always  in  another  manner;  a  change  wnich 
is  capable  at  the  end  of  bringing  forth  the  result  is  a  special  change,  because  it  is  espe- 
cially elevated  above  other  changes,  as  f.  i.  consciousness  at  death,  which  is  combined  with 
assuming  new  existence. 
"54  Litt.  108.  b.  1:  Allthough  there  is  precedence  of  various  actions  the  force  created  by 
those  which  are  weighty,  or  are  near,  or  inveterated  manifest  itself,  others  not.  Accordingly  it 
is  said:  «of  the  existing,  previously  accomplished  actions  weighty,  near,  accustomed  to,  each  first, 
does  ripen». 
55  This  concluding  section  has  been  rendered  freely,  its  closer  translation  would  scarcely 
convey  any  definite  meaning  without  a  previous  knowledge  of  the  very  complicated  theory  of 
different  causes  exposed  in  the  second  koeasthäna.  Cf.  О.  Розевберг,  Проблемы,  eh.  XV  and 
L.  de  la  Vallee  Poussin,  The  way  to  Nirvana  p.  88  etc.  WTe  subjoin  a  litteral  translation: 
(108.  o.  3).  Here  the  force  to  produce  a  vipäkaphala  which  is  produced  by  a  vipäkahetu 
disappears  after  having  produced  the  vipaka.  And  the  force  which  produces  nisyandaphala  which 
is  produced  by  a  sabhägahetu  disappears  after  an  antidote  for  klis$a-(dharinas)  has  been  pro- 
duced. The  continuity  of  consciousness  of  the  aklistas  (=  kucala  and  anivrtävyäkrta)  is  stopped 
at  the  time  of  final  Nirvana.  (108.  b.  5).  But  why  does  another  vipäka  not  arise  from  the  vipaka, 
like  from  a  fruit's  seed-grain  (another  seed-grain)?  First  of  all  every  thing  is  not  like  the  example. 
An  even  in  this  case  the  seed  does  not  arise  from  the  fruit  directly.  But  how?  It  arises  from  a 
special  change  which  is  produced  by  special  decomposition.  The  form  which  is  produced  from  it 
which  is  the  achiever  of  the  sprout,  this  is  the  seed  of  it,  not  another.  The  previous  course  is 
Извѣстія  P.  A  H.  1919. 
