Reason and Instinct. 



6489 



It is, perhaps, unnecessary to say, that in speaking of mind some- 

 thing quite distinct from any part of the material organization of the 

 animal is intended ; although we may and do hold that the mind 

 works through, or by means of, a certain part of that organization — 

 namely, the brain. And it may be observed, in passing (and in 

 reference to allusions made a few lines above), that in whatever degree 

 it is satisfactorily established, that the higher parts of the human 

 brain are the organs through which the human intellect acts, in almost 

 the same degree is the fact that brutes possess, at least, a modification 

 of precisely the same organs, converted into a powerful argument in 

 support of the belief that they too have a mind to act upon and 

 through those organs ; a mind, moreover, of the same nature with, 

 and intended to act after, the manner of their great prototype. 



But possessing a mind — even though it be but what Sydney Smith 

 terms e< fragments of soul and tatters of understanding" — it follows of 

 necessity that they have a will also; not, indeed, a dominant, irre- 

 sistible* will, such as is met with in the majority of the human 

 species, but still sufficient for the purpose. And here, again, obser- 

 vation steps in, and supplies us with sufficient proof of the soundness 

 of the inference; and this will, like the mind, is quite independent of 

 the brain, as to or for its existence, though, of course, not so as re- 

 gards its manifestation or exercise. 



* Irresistible as compared with that which it is brought to bear on : I am aware 

 that in saying what T do in the text I am advancing an opinion which, at the least, 

 seems to be at variance with that expressed by Dr. Carpenter. " Notwithstanding 

 the evidences of Rationality," we find him saying, " which many of the lower 

 animals present, and the manifestations which they display of emotions that are 

 similar to our own, there is no ground to believe that they have any of that controlling 

 power, from the will, namely, over their psychical operations, which we possess. On 

 the contrary, all observation leads to the conclusion that they are under complete 

 dominion of the ideas and emotions by which they are for the time possessed, and 

 have no power either of repressing these by a forcible act of will, or of turning the 

 attention by a like voluntaiy effort into another channel. So that they may, in this 

 respect, be like the dreamer, the somnambule or the insane." I certainly do think 

 these remarks are not borne out by observation ; nay, are indeed contradicted by it. 

 The dog or the cat, which are taught, by thousands and tens of thousands, to retain 

 their urine and their dung until they can obtain egress from the room or the house, 

 surely exercise a measure of will in doing so ; particularly as the functions in question 

 are generally believed to be performed by animals without any particular conscious- 

 ness of the act, if any at all. The trout that rises to the angler's fly, but rendered 

 suspicious by some unnatural appearance it detects, turns aside without taking it, — 

 perhaps even darts off in evident alarm,— surely does so voluntarily, or by an effort of 

 will. And innumerable other instances of the same sort are available. 



XVII. 2 A 



