Reason and Instinct. 



6585 



Reason mid Instinct. By Thomas Boyd, Esq. 



The author of the paper on Reason and Instinct has evidently 

 studied the subject far more than I have had the opportunity of doing, 

 and yet, if you think your readers are not tired of it, I should be glad 

 to make some remarks upon it. 



As a proof that animals do exercise powers beyond those included 

 under the term Instinct the paper in question is quite conclusive, but 

 it seems to me to go beyond this, and to hide if not to obliterate the 

 boundary line between man and the brute creation. 



The rock on which almost all discussions on Instinct make shipwreck 

 is the attempt to separate the various acts of an animal's life into two 

 distinct classes, viz. — those dependent on Instinct, and those to be 

 attributed to Reason : such a separation I believe to be simply im- 

 possible ; the only one which is possible being one which goes far 

 deeper than this and divides each act into its constituent parts ; to 

 take, for example, an " instance of pure simple instinct " (Zool. 6052 

 and 6054), the return of animals from a distance to their home, often 

 by the use of other means than those supplied by their own limbs ; if 

 this be analysed we find first, the desire to return home (this is an 

 impulse about which the animal has no choice), which is a part of his 

 nature and true instinct : there is, secondly, a knowledge where that 

 home is ; this also is instinctive ; he has not to learn it, he has no choice 

 whether he will learn it or not ; but he knows it ; and then, in addition 

 to these, there is the adoption of means by which this instinctive 

 impulse, thus made possible by instinctive power, is carried out into 

 actual life ; and here there is choice — there is the deliberate adapting 

 of means to the end in view, and this is Reason. 



There is thus a radical distinction in the ideas included under the 

 common term Instinct; and this seems to be borne out by the definition 

 given (Zool. 6043). It is there called a " certain power or disposition 

 of mind by which " animals do certain things ; now, are "power" and 

 "disposition" synonymous terms? and if not how is it that they 

 are both used, and are both suitable here unless it be as I have 

 suggested ? 



The classification of the principal forms of instinctive action (Zool. 

 6082, 6083) does not seem to me satisfactory, partly from being so much 

 founded on the outward act, partly from the absence of the distinction 

 pointed out above, and partly from the absence of several important 

 forms. I should propose in its stead something of this kind : — 

 XVII. 2 N 



