6586 



Reason and Instinct. 



First, as the three main divisions of instinctive impulse, those which 

 impel an animal 



1. To self-preservation. 



2. To the preservation of its species, 



3. To submission to man. 



(This last is entirely omitted but seems to me as truly instinctive as 

 either of the others, and, as a motive to action, quite as important ; it 

 is universal in the animal world, and shows itself unmistakeably where 

 the human soul is obscured by idiocy or madness). 



Secondly, as subordinate to these, the various passions, as love, fear, 

 revenge, &c. 



And lastly, those separate impulses from which arise all the varieties 

 of habit and mode of life, as swimming in the duck and herding in 

 the buffalo. 



This seems to include all cases of instinctive impulse, and then there 

 is instinctive knowledge which consists in a power to do, without 

 previous experience and without instruction, whatever in the ordinary 

 course of nature each animal is called to. 



And these two forms of instinct, combined with a rational use and 

 choice of means to the ends so supplied and a power of learning, seem 

 to me to embrace the whole range of animal life. We have seen their 

 application to one of the simpler forms of instinctive action ; let us 

 look now at one of the more difficult, for instance at that quoted from 

 Coleridge (Zool. 6050), of dogs preserving the lives and avenging the 

 deaths of their masters : here, if submission to human authority and 

 the subordinate passions of love and hatred be instinctive, they supply 

 the motive of the various acts without any choice on the part of the 

 dog ; there is in this case just as much as in his return home from a 

 distance, an end set before him which he is obliged by the laws of his 

 nature to endeavour to carry out. 



There do occur cases (Zool. 6489 and note) in which there appears 

 a choice between the end actually carried out and some other, but I 

 believe it will always be found that both ends are supplied by instinct; 

 and consequently that it is not a question of choice, but merely presents 

 this appearance on account of the nearly-balanced strength of the 

 instinctive impulses : take, for instance, the case of a horse impelled 

 on the one hand by the fear of some unknown object to run away, and 

 on the other by his obedience to his rider to go forward ; his conduct 

 will waver just as either of these motives acquires ascendancy: he will 

 be induced to go forward either by being allowed to assure himself of 

 the harmlessncss of the source of his fear, i.e. by the weakening of 



