m THE NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC MAGAZINE 



five wounded from a crew of the same 

 size. 



I could mention a number of similar 

 instances which demonstrate my state- 

 ment that at that time we were able to 

 shoot well, and we have been shooting 

 better ever since. Not only the men of 

 the North, but the men of the South, 

 shot well during the Civil War ; they shot 

 well during the Spanish War; and we 

 can shoot half a dozen times as well to- 

 day as we could during the Spanish War. 

 Admiral Evans could tell you that when 

 Admiral Dewey went into Manila Bay, 

 if his guns could have been as effectively 

 used as they could today, that there 

 would have been no necessity to with- 

 draw and anchor for breakfast, for the 

 work would have been finished before the 

 breakfast hour. Never has the American 

 Navy made such a record as it is making 

 today, and never has there been a navy 

 having a record excelling the one which 

 ■ our Navy is now making for capacity to 

 hit the* target. That is really the whole 

 war problem — to hit what you are shoot- 

 ing at. 



But while it is all very well, though it 

 .may not be profitable, to discuss the 

 things which we have done in time of 

 war, it is wise for us to consider those 

 things which it will be necessary for us 

 to do to prepare for and conduct future 

 wars. At this late hour, while it will be 

 impossible for me to discuss many of 

 our requirements, I do want to refer to 

 one or two of them. 



We should make changes in the organ- 

 ization of the Navy Department. The 

 Secretary of the Navy is here, and he 

 would doubtless say to you, if he were 

 not acting in his official capacity, that he 

 thinks an organization could be made 

 which would make the department much 

 more efficient than it is today. We ought 

 to facilitate promotion, so that young 

 men will reach command rank earlier 

 than they have in the past. Every man 

 here will testify that when he was in the 

 thirties he was a good executive in what- 

 ever capacity he was serving; that that 

 was the period when he took responsi- 



bility lightly, and was able to do an 

 unlimited amount, of initiatory work. 

 When he passed into the forties he be- 

 came more conservative ; he assumed re- 

 sponsibility with more hesitancy than 

 earlier ; and as he goes into the fifties, 

 if he has not had placed on him up to 

 that time heavy responsibilities, that he 

 has become, instead of a confident man, 

 a shrinking man to a degree incapable of 

 assuming responsibility when it was 

 placed on him. 



The man in the twenties should be the 

 watch officer of our ships; the man in 

 the thirties should serve, as navigator or 

 executive ; the man in the forties should 

 be the commanding officer of our ships, 

 and the man in the fifties should com- 

 mand our fleets. If that policy were fol- 

 lowed and made elastic enough to fit 

 circumstances, we would have men who 

 were capable of assuming the responsi- 

 bilities placed upon them. This responsi- 

 bility is enormous. When a man com- 

 mands a battleship which has cost ten 

 millions of dollars, with hundreds of 

 lives at stake, it requires nerve as well 

 as capacity, and such places demand the 

 best men we have in our service. 



One more matter : We have not in the 

 past built homogeneous fleets. We build 

 a surplus of battleships and then provide 

 the men to man them, and frequently 

 provide more than we have ships for. 

 We build auxiliaries and torpedo boats, 

 if we do it at all, without any regard to 

 the relation which such craft should bear 

 to the battleship fleet, and while we have 

 built or have in construction twenty-nine 

 battleships, we have practically no means 

 of furnishing tenders for them under 

 service conditions. 



When the battleship fleet was sent to 

 the Pacific recently it was necessary to 

 charter forty foreign ships to carry coal 

 for it. If it had been found necessary 

 to send the fleet around the Horn in time 

 of war it could not have been attempted, 

 because we could not have furnished 

 American vessels in which to carry the 

 coal. 



Very few people realize the deplorable 



