PLAN OF ATTACK ON THE EAST COAST. 



351 



to assail our Army of Occupation, soon reached the officers who had 

 been left in command at our headquarters during Taylor's absence; 

 and, in consequence of a despatch sent by express to General 

 Wool at Parras for reinforcements, that officer immediately put his 

 whole column in motion, and, after marching one hundred and 

 twenty miles in four days, found himself at Agua Nueva, within 

 twenty-one miles of Saltillo. Thus sustained, the officers in com- 

 mand, awaited with anxiety, the movements of the Mexican chief 

 and the return of General Taylor. 



But, in the meantime, the administration at home, seeing the 

 inutility of continuing the attacks upon the more northern outposts 

 of Mexico, — which it was, nevertheless, resolved to hold as in- 

 demnifying hostages, inasmuch as they were contiguous to our own 

 soil and boundaries, — determined to strike a blow at the vitals of 

 Mexico by seizing her principal eastern port and proceeding 

 thence to the capital. For this purpose, General Scott, who had 

 been set aside at the commencement of the war in consequence of 

 a rupture between himself and the war department whilst arranging 

 the details of the campaign, — was once more summoned into the 

 field and appointed commander-in-chief of the American army in 

 Mexico. Up to this period, November, 1846, large recruits of 

 regulars and volunteers had flocked to the standard of Taylor and 

 were stationed at various posts in the valley of the Rio Grande, 

 under the command of Generals Butler, Worth, Patterson, Quit- 

 man and Pillow. But the project of a descent upon Vera Cruz, 

 which was warmly advocated by General Scott, made it necessary 

 to detach a considerable portion of these levies, and of their most 

 efficient and best drilled members. Taylor and his subordinate 

 commanders, were thus, placed in a mere defensive position, and 

 that, too, at a moment when they were threatened in front by the 

 best army that had been assembled for many a year in Mexico. 



It is probable that the government of the United States, at the 

 moment it planned this expedition to Vera Cruz and the capital, 

 was not fully apprised of the able and efficient arrangements of 

 Santa Anna, or imagined that he would immediately quit San 

 Luis Potosi in order to defend the eastern access to the capital, 

 inasmuch as it was not probable that Taylor would venture to 

 penetrate the country with impaired forces, which, in a strictly 

 military point of view, were not more than adequate for garrison 

 service along an extended base of three hundred miles. But, 

 as the sequel showed, they neither estimated properly the time 

 that would be consumed in concentrating the forces and pre- 



