PATH OVER THE PEDREGAL TO CONTRERAS. 



393 



But among the mass of information which the American General 

 received at Puebla, his engineers learned that there was a pathway 

 through this Pedregal whose route had been indicated by the spies 

 with sufficient distinctness and certainty to justify a hope that he 

 might be able to render it practicable for his whole army, and, thus, 

 enable him to turn the right flank of the Mexicans' strongest posi- 

 tions. There is no doubt, as subsequent events demonstrated, that 

 the ground in the neighborhood of Contreras, where the road de- 

 scends from the mountains and barrancas towards San Angel was 

 of great importance to the Mexicans in the defence of the various 

 modes of access to the city, and it is unquestionable that a strong 

 post should have been placed in that quarter to cripple the Ameri- 

 can advance. It is stated by Mexican writers, that General Men- 

 doza, with two members of his topographical corps had reconnoi- 

 tred this route and pass, and pronounced it " absolutely indefensible." 

 It is probable, therefore, that no general action, involving the for- 

 tunes of a division, or of a large mass of the Mexican army, should 

 have been risked among the ravines between the mountains and the 

 Pedregal near Contreras ; yet we do not believe that it should have 

 been left by Santa Anna without a force capable of making a staunch 

 resistance. 



We are now acquainted with the ground, and with the positions 

 of the two armies. Scott's plan was to force a passage by either 

 or both of the two adits to the levels of the valley in front of the 

 city, while Santa Anna's, according to his manifesto dated subse- 

 quently on the 23d of August, was to have made a concerted retro- 

 grade movement with his troops, and to have staked the fortunes 

 of the capital on a great battle, in which all his fresh, enthusiastic, 

 and unharmed troops would have been brought into a general action 

 against the comparatively small American army, upon an open 

 ground where he would have had full opportunity to use and mancEu- 

 vre infantry, cavalry and artillery. 



But this plan was disconcerted at first, and probably destroyed, 

 both in its materiel and morale, by the gross disobedience of Gen- 

 eral Valencia, who forgot as a soldier, that there can never be two 

 commanders in the field. Valencia, apparently resolving to seize 

 the first opportunity to attack the Americans, in spite of the reported 

 untenable character of the ground about Padierna or Contreras, left 

 his quarters at Coyoacan and San Angel, and advanced, without 

 consulting his commander, to Contreras, upon whose heights he 

 threw up an entrenched camp! As soon as Santa Anna learned this 

 fact, he ordered the vain and reckless officer to retire, but finding 



