414 REFLECTIONS AND CRITICISM ON THIS BATTLE. 



musket ammunition. Three thousand two hundred and fifty-one 

 Americans, had on this day, driven four times their number from 

 a selected field ; but they had paid a large and noble tribute to 

 death for the victory. Nine officers were included in the one 

 hundred and sixteen of our killed, and forty-nine officers in the six 

 hundred and sixty-five of our wounded. The Mexicans suffered 

 greatly in wounded and slain, while the gallant General Leon and 

 Colonel Balderas fell fighting bravely on the field of battle. 1 



The battle was over by nine o'clock in the morning. The Ameri- 

 cans, after collecting their dead and wounded, retired from the 

 bloody field, but they were not allowed to mourn over their painful 

 losses. They had suffered severely, yet the battle had been most 

 disastrous to the Mexicans. The fine commands of Generals Perez 

 and Leon and of Colonel Balderas, were broken up ; the position 

 once destroyed, could not serve for a second defence, and the mor- 

 ale of the soldiers had suffered. The Mexicans were beginning to 

 believe that mere formidable masses, if not directed by skilful chiefs, 

 were, in truth, but harmless things, and not to be relied on very 

 confidently for national defence. The new levies, the old regular 



1 This was a great but a rash victory. The American infantry relying chiefly on 

 the bayonet and expecting to effect its object by surprise and even at an earlier hour 

 of the morning, advanced with portions of the three thousand two hundred and fifty- 

 one men to attack at least eleven or twelve thousand Mexicans upon a field selected 

 by themselves, protected by stone walls and ditches, commanded by the fortress of 

 Chapultepec and the ground swept by artillery, while four thousand cavalry threa- 

 tened an overwhelming charge ! We have no criticism to make as to inequality of 

 numbers, but although we believe that our officers did not anticipate so strong 

 a resistance, we are satisfied that it would have been better to rely at first upon the 

 fatal work of mortars and siege pieces, of which we had abundance, and, then, to 

 have permitted the bayonet to complete the task the battering train had begun. If the 

 difficulty of moving rapidly to the scene of action in the night, prevented a night at- 

 tack and surprise, it would probably have been better to change the plan of battle 

 even at a late hour. In the end, Duncan's great guns, effectually destroyed a post 

 which had been the slaughter house of many a noble American soldier. The Mexi- 

 can cavalry behaved shamefully. In Colonel Ramsey's notes on the translation of 

 the Mexican Aipuntes para la historia de la Guerra, fyc, p. 347, he says : " it is now 

 known* n Mexico that Santa Anna was in possession of General Scott's order to 

 attack the Molino del Rey in a few hours after it was written, and during the whole 

 of the 7th, troops were taking up their positions on that ground. It is believed further 

 that Santa Anna knew the precise force that was to attack. When, therefore, Scott 

 supposed that Worth would surprise the Mills and Casa Mata, he was met by what? 

 Shall the veil be raised a little further ? There was a traitor among the list of high 

 ranking officers in the Mexican army, and for gold he told the Mexican force. Scott 

 had been betrayed by one not an American, not an officer or soldier, but Santa Anna 

 was betrayed by one of his own officers and a Mexican. Santa Anna believed the 

 information he received and acted on it. General Scott did not believe what he 

 learned at night, and — the victory was won !" 



